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Clear But Unconvincing: The Federal
Circuit’s Invalidity Standard
David O. Taylor*
ABSTRACT
The Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity of patent
claims is clear. The Federal Circuit always requires clear and
convincing evidence to prove that a patent claim is invalid. The
rationale behind this standard, however, is unconvincing. There
are significant reasons to believe that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) rarely considers the most relevant
prior art and that, instead, alleged infringers often find prior art that
is more relevant than the prior art considered by the USPTO. It
defies logic to apply the clear and convincing burden where the
USPTO considered only prior art that is less relevant than the prior
art asserted in litigation. And while the Federal Circuit relies upon
35 U.S.C. § 282 as dictating the clear and convincing burden of
proof, the statute includes no such burden. Indeed, every other
circuit court of appeals has indicated that the statutory presumption
of validity only requires a presumption that the USPTO correctly
ruled upon the evidence in front of it—not that the USPTO
considered the most relevant prior art or that it, illogically,
correctly ruled upon evidence it did not even consider. To
encourage the disclosure of relevant prior art to the USPTO, to
increase patent quality, to ensure that patents serve their
constitutional purpose of rewarding inventors for disclosing
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discoveries, and to reduce transaction costs associated with
ultimately invalid patents, the clear and convincing burden of
proving invalidity should be replaced with a preponderance burden
when litigation involves unconsidered, material prior art.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity of patent
claims is clear. The Federal Circuit always requires clear and
convincing evidence to prove that a patent claim is invalid.1 The
rationale behind this standard, however, is unconvincing. The
Federal Circuit requires clear and convincing evidence because it
presumes that the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) has considered the most relevant prior art and still
allowed the patent claims to issue.2 The Federal Circuit believes
courts should overturn the USPTO’s decision only if there is clear
and convincing evidence that the USPTO made a mistake. The
presumption underlying the Federal Circuit’s standard, however, is
flawed—significantly flawed.

1
2

See cases cited infra note 68.
See infra Part I.B.
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There are many reasons to believe that the USPTO rarely
considers the most relevant prior art.3 The USPTO has limited
resources and patent examiners lack incentives to find the most
relevant prior art.4 Moreover, patent prosecution is largely an ex
parte procedure that excludes public participation. The Federal
Circuit’s standard for invalidity discourages patent applicants from
even investigating prior art. As a result of this confluence of
factors, it is likely that, after patents issue, parties alleged to have
infringed those patents often find prior art that is more relevant
than the prior art considered by the USPTO.
While it is logical for courts to apply the clear and convincing
burden of proof to patent claims where the USPTO considered
prior art that is more relevant than prior art asserted in litigation—
or at least just as relevant as that prior art—it is not logical to apply
this burden where the USPTO considered only prior art that is less
relevant than the prior art asserted in the litigation. And while the
Federal Circuit relies upon 35 U.S.C. § 282 as requiring the clear
and convincing burden of proof, the statute includes no such
burden.5 The statute merely requires that parties asserting
invalidity bear the burden of establishing invalidity and that courts
and juries presume that patents are valid.6 While the Federal
Circuit has latched onto the statutory presumption of validity in
particular as requiring the clear and convincing burden of proof in
all instances, every other circuit court of appeals that interpreted
the presumption before the creation of the Federal Circuit came to
a different conclusion.7 Instead, the other circuit courts concluded
that the statutory presumption of validity requires only a
presumption that the USPTO correctly ruled upon the evidence in
front of it—not that the USPTO considered the most relevant prior
art or that it, illogically, correctly ruled upon evidence it did not
even consider.
This Article reviews the Federal Circuit’s standard for proving
invalidity of patents and its rationale for that standard, analyzes
3
4
5
6
7

See discussion infra Part II.B.
Id.
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
See id.
See infra Part III.B.3.b.
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problems associated with the standard and the rationale, and
concludes that the Federal Circuit’s standard should be replaced
with a new standard that is supported by logic, Supreme Court
precedent, and the standards articulated by every other circuit court
of appeals. This Article proposes replacing the clear and
convincing burden of proof with a preponderance burden of proof
when litigation involves unconsidered, material prior art.
Part I of this Article examines the Federal Circuit’s standard
for proving invalidity of patent claims, in terms of both its
historical development and the rationale allegedly supporting it.
Part II considers some of the problems associated with the Federal
Circuit’s standard, from both a logical as well as a utilitarian
standpoint. Part III proposes and evaluates the support and
benefits of replacing the clear and convincing burden of proof with
a preponderance burden of proof when litigation involves
unconsidered, material prior art.
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STANDARD FOR PROVING INVALIDITY
Since its formation, the Federal Circuit has adhered to a strict
standard for proving that a patent is invalid. Under that standard, a
party challenging the validity of a patent, to succeed in its
challenge, always must prove invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.8 The rationale for this strict standard is that the USPTO,
in its expertise, has approved the patent in view of the most
relevant prior art, and the belief that the USPTO’s approval should
be respected absent clear and convincing evidence that the USPTO
made a mistake.9
A. The Standard: Clear and Convincing Evidence in Every
Circumstance
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 282 states that a patent shall
be presumed valid and that the burden of proving invalidity shall
rest on the party asserting invalidity:

8
9

See cases cited infra note 68.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
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A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a
patent (whether in independent, dependent, or
multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid
independently of the validity of other claims;
dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be
presumed valid even though dependent upon an
invalid claim. . . . The burden of establishing
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest
on the party asserting such invalidity.10
Nowhere, however, does 35 U.S.C. § 282 explain exactly what
the burden of proving invalidity is. Is the burden a preponderance
of the evidence? Clear and convincing evidence?11 Evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt? On its face, the statute does not
answer these questions. Stepping into this void, the Federal Circuit
has interpreted the first sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 282—the statutory
presumption of validity—to mean that an alleged infringer always
must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.12 Indeed,
the Federal Circuit has interpreted the statutory presumption of
validity to set forth a clear and convincing burden of proof
regardless of whether the USPTO actually considered the most
relevant prior art.13
1. Historical Development Of The Standard
Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 and vested in it
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve appeals of claims arising under the
patent laws.14 It did so in response to concerns about both a lack
of uniformity in the interpretation of the patent laws by the circuit

10

35 U.S.C. § 282.
The “clear and convincing” burden of proof is an intermediate burden that lies
somewhere between “beyond a reasonable doubt” and a “preponderance of the evidence.”
Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “Clear and
convincing” evidence is evidence that produces in the mind of the trier of fact an abiding
conviction that the truth of the factual contentions are highly probable. Id.
12
See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359–60
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
13
See, e.g., R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
14
See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982); H.R. Rpt. No. 97-312, at 20–22 (1981); S. Rpt. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981).
11
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courts and the “forum shopping” that these divergent
interpretations had generated.15 The Federal Circuit quickly
exercised that jurisdiction in its first two years to render a series of
early opinions interpreting the statutory presumption of validity
and articulating the standard for proving invalidity of patents.
a) Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory
presumption of validity traces its roots to an opinion written by
Chief Judge Markey, the first chief judge of the Federal Circuit,
prior to the court’s formation.16 In Solder Removal Co. v. U.S.
International Trade Commission,17 the Federal Circuit’s
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
reviewed an administrative law judge’s conclusion that the
presumption of validity does not exist when the most pertinent
prior art was neither presented to nor considered by the USPTO.18
The court held that this conclusion was “unsound.”19
While conceding that rebuttal of the presumption of validity
may be more easily and more often achieved by relying on prior art
more pertinent than the prior art considered by the USPTO, the
court explained that until the prior art actually renders the claimed
invention anticipated or obvious, the presumption of validity is not
rebutted and “continues alive and well.”20 The court interpreted 35
U.S.C. § 282 as placing the burden of coming forward with
evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the party
15
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 820 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). In the context of the subject of this Article—the standard for proving
invalidity—it is ironic that the Federal Circuit was formed to resolve concerns about both
the lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the patent laws and forum shopping. As
discussed below, the Federal Circuit adopted an interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 282 and an
evidentiary standard for proving invalidity that conflict with the views of every other
circuit court of appeals, views that are expressed plainly in numerous opinions that predate the establishment of the Federal Circuit. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.
16
See Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (C.C.P.A.
1978); see also In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
17
582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
18
Id. at 632.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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asserting that a patent is invalid, and concluded that the burden of
persuasion always remains upon the party asserting invalidity,
regardless of whether the most pertinent prior art was considered
by the USPTO.21 Moreover, the court noted that the USPTO’s
failure to cite particular prior art does not necessarily mean that
that prior art was not considered by the examiner because the
examiner may have considered it and determined that it was
unworthy of citation.22
The court ultimately held that the statute does not make the
presumption applicable in some situations but not in others.23
Instead, the court indicated that the distinction between situations
in which the most pertinent prior art was considered by the USPTO
and situations in which it was not is “judge-made.”24 As a result,
21

Id. at 632–33. Notably, the court justified its holding with respect to the
presumption of validity by highlighting the burden of persuasion, which is stated
separately in 35 U.S.C. § 282. Id. at 633 n.8. Some have concluded that the presumption
of validity only places the initial burden of coming forward with evidence on the alleged
infringer. See B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement
Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 380, 387 (2008). And at least one Federal
Circuit opinion supports that view. See Lear-Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d
881, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The presumption of patent validity found in 35 U.S.C. § 282
is but a procedural device which places on a party asserting invalidity the initial burden
of going forward to establish a prima facie case on that issue.”). The resolution of which
party bears the initial burden of coming forward with evidence, however, fails to resolve
the issue of what the exact burden of persuasion should be in any particular context.
22
Solder Removal Co., 582 F.2d at 633 n.9. This statement—that the failure to cite
prior art does not necessarily mean that it was not considered because the examiner may
have determined that it was unworthy of citation—does not justify the court’s sweeping
conclusion that the burden of persuasion always remains upon the party asserting
invalidity, regardless of whether the most pertinent prior art was considered by the
USPTO. Just because a rationale is not always true, that fact does not justify a standard
that effectively assumes that the rationale is never true. Nor does this statement support
applying the clear and convincing burden regardless of whether the most pertinent prior
art actually was considered by the USPTO. See discussion infra Part III.B.
23
Solder Removal Co., 582 F.2d at 633. While it is true that the statute requires the
application of the presumption of validity to every patent, the statute does not indicate
that the presumption of validity requires the same evidentiary burden of persuasion to
apply to every piece of prior art regardless of whether the USPTO considered it.
24
Id. This criticism lacks any force. The statutory presumption of validity simply
codified the common law presumption of validity. H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82-1923 (1952).
The common law recognized the same distinction between situations in which the most
pertinent prior art was considered by the USPTO and situations in which it was not. See
H.F. Harmann, Editorial Notes, The New Patent Act and the Presumption of Validity, 21
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575, 576–78 (1953) (cataloguing cases predating the 1952 Patent

C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CLEAR BUT UNCONVINCING

3/15/2011 10:20 PM

301

the court criticized holdings of other courts that the presumption is
“weakened,” “undercut,” “dissipated,” or “destroyed” in this
situation.25 Nevertheless, the court reiterated that the burden of
persuasion may be more easily met by evidence consisting of more
pertinent prior art than that considered by the examiner.26
Viewed in context, Solder Removal Co. simply rejected the
proposition that the burden of persuasion ever shifts from alleged
infringers to patent owners. Whatever the presumption of validity
means, it cannot contradict the clear statutory language that the
“burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”27 Moreover, it is
important to note that the court was not squarely presented with the
question of the appropriate burden for proving invalidity—clear
and convincing evidence, a preponderance of the evidence, or
evidence proving invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt—and
therefore did not resolve that question. That said, it did indicate—
twice—that the burden of persuasion may be more easily met by
evidence consisting of more pertinent prior art than that considered
by the examiner.28

Act making distinctions based on whether the most pertinent prior art was considered by
the USPTO).
25
Solder Removal Co., 582 F.2d at 633. The court did not recognize that if the
presumption of validity is restricted to placing the initial burden of coming forward with
evidence on the alleged infringer, this initial burden would be destroyed if the alleged
infringer is able to meet this burden. In that situation, the burden of coming forward with
evidence would revert to the patent owner.
26
Id. The court noted that the application of 35 U.S.C. § 282 has “suffered from
analogy of the presumption itself to the deference due administrative agencies.” Id. at 633
n.10. In this way the court seemingly recognized that this “analogy”—which is actually
the rationale underlying the presumption of validity itself—does not fully support its
conclusion.
27
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
28
In the Federal Circuit’s very first opinion, S. Corp. v. United States, the court set a
path that was doomed to conflict with every other circuit court of appeals on the issue of
the standard governing allegations of invalidity. The en banc court held that the holdings
of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals would bind the Federal
Circuit. 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). Thus, the holding of Solder
Removal Company v. U.S. International Trade Commission would act as controlling
precedent on future panels of the Federal Circuit.
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b) SSIH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission
In SSIH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. International Trade
Commission,29 the Federal Circuit issued its first opinion
addressing the statutory presumption of validity articulated in 35
U.S.C. § 282.30 The court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Nies,
began by adopting the holding of Solder Removal Co., indicating
that the presumption of validity is not altered by the introduction at
trial of more relevant prior art than the prior art considered at the
USPTO.31 The court then effectively restated the major holdings
of Solder Removal Co.: the presumption of validity places both the
burden of going forward with evidence and the burden of
persuasion upon the party asserting invalidity, and if a party
introduces prior art more relevant than that considered by the
examiner, the party is more likely to carry its burden of
persuasion.32
The court went further, however, and addressed whether any
burden of persuasion should apply to the question of invalidity.
Criticizing the Commission’s statement that there must be “clear
and convincing evidence of invalidity,” the court deemed it
“inappropriate” to speak in terms of a particular burden of proof
being necessary to reach a legal conclusion on the issue of
obviousness.33 The court went on to note that while “certain facts
in patent litigation must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, the formulation of a legal conclusion on validity from
the established facts is a matter reserved for the court.”34 Then the
Federal Circuit noted that it was a reviewing court whose role is
29

718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
SSIH Equipment S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 374–75 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
31
Id. at 375.
32
Id. Other early Federal Circuit cases relied upon SSIH Equip. S.A. for one or both of
these points, presumably because SSIH Equip. S.A. was the first Federal Circuit opinion
to make the same points. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d
1563, 1566 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 282 permanently places the burden of
proving facts necessary to a conclusion of invalidity on the party asserting such
invalidity).
33
SSIH Equip. S.A., 718 F.2d at 375.
34
Id. (citing Radio Corp. v. Radio Labs., 293 U.S. 1 (1934)).
30
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limited to determining whether the facts on which a judgment of
validity or invalidity was based were satisfactorily established and
whether those facts form an adequate predicate for the ultimate
legal conclusion of obviousness.35
When SSIH Equipment S.A. is viewed in context, other than
adopting the holdings of Solder Removal Co., the court merely
noted that neither trial courts nor the Federal Circuit are bound to
apply any burden of proof on the ultimate issue of obviousness,
although the clear and convincing burden of proof does apply to
“certain” unidentified facts.36 Moreover, the court did not even
consider the question of whether the clear and convincing burden
of proof on questions of fact related to invalidity is appropriate in
every instance, or whether some lesser burden of proof should
apply in certain circumstances.
c) Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.
In Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,37 the Federal Circuit, in
an opinion by Chief Judge Markey, the author of Solder Removal
Co., again held that the introduction of more pertinent prior art
than that considered by the examiner does not weaken or destroy
the presumption of validity or shift the burden of persuasion.38
The court noted that the introduction of more pertinent prior art
than that considered by the examiner nevertheless can facilitate the
carrying of the burden of persuasion by the party claiming
invalidity by requiring the party supporting validity to come
forward with countervailing evidence.39 Again, however, the court
did not consider the question of the appropriate burden of proof
required to prove invalidity, or whether that burden is lower in
some circumstances.

35
36
37
38
39

SSIH Equip. S.A., 718 F.2d at 375.
Id.
713 F.2d 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1534.
Id.

C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

304

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/15/2011 10:20 PM

[Vol. 21:293

d) Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
In Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,40 the Federal Circuit, in
another opinion by Chief Judge Markey, for the first time reached
the question of the appropriate burden of proof required to prove
invalidity. The court’s discussion of this issue, however, is dicta—
the issue did not influence the judgment and was neither defended
nor attacked on appeal.41 Thus, it should be recognized that the
court’s opinion has little, if any, precedential value. Nonetheless,
it is important to recognize the content and reasoning of the
opinion.
The court began by again rejecting the proposition that where
pertinent or relevant prior art was not considered by the USPTO
the presumption of validity is severely weakened and eroded.42
The court justified this holding by noting that there is virtually
always pertinent and relevant prior art not considered by the
USPTO.43 And the court again recognized that the patent
challenger’s burden may be carried more easily when it utilizes
unconsidered prior art that is more relevant than the prior art
considered by the USPTO.44
The Court went further, however. It rejected the proposition
that when “any relevant” non-considered prior art is introduced,
the burden upon the patent challenger is thereby changed from a
requirement for clear and convincing proof to one of proof by a
mere preponderance.45 The court concluded that the introduction
40

722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
The court noted portions of a district court’s opinion that reflected the law of the
various regional circuits prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit “did not influence
the judgment appealed from and are neither defended nor attacked on appeal,” and
indicated its disagreement. Id. at 1548.
42
Id. at 1549 n.17.
43
Id. It is unclear how the fact that there is virtually always pertinent and relevant
prior art not considered by the USPTO justifies a holding that the presumption of validity
is never weakened and eroded, but that is what the court held. Moreover, this concession
undermines the statement in Solder Removal Co. that the USPTO’s failure to cite
particular prior art does not necessarily mean that that prior art was not considered by the
examiner because the examiner may have considered it and determined that it was
unworthy of citation. Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 633
n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.7.
44
Connell, 722 F.2d at 1549.
45
Id. at 1549.
41
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of art or other evidence not considered by the USPTO does not
change the burden and does not change the requirement that that
evidence establish invalidity clearly and convincingly.46
It is important to note that the court’s consideration and
resolution of the issue of the appropriate burden of proof to apply
was limited to the question of whether any relevant, nonconsidered prior art changes the burden of proof from clear and
convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence. The
court did not address the more difficult question of whether prior
art that is more relevant than prior art considered by the USPTO
reduces the burden of persuasion. The court’s reasoning, however,
foreshadowed how it would decide the question.
e) American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.
In American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,47 the
Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Rich, rejected a
jury instruction explaining that the burden of proof shifts from the
accused infringer to the patent owner when the accused infringer
cites prior art that is more pertinent than the prior art utilized by
the patent examiner.48 This instruction would have emphasized
that, in this circumstance, the presumption of validity “disappears”
and the patent owner has the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.49 The court found this instruction erroneous in
two respects. First, according to the court, it misassigned the
burden of proof that 35 U.S.C. § 282 mandates rests upon the party
asserting invalidity whether or not the most pertinent prior art was
considered by the examiner.50 Second, according to the court, it
failed to explain accurately the presumption of validity.51
On the second point, the court recognized a “prevailing
confusion” in the cases over the meaning and effect of the
46

Id.
725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
48
Id. at 1358.
49
Id.
50
Id. In this regard, the Federal Circuit rejected the contrary holding of the Ninth
Circuit in Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980). The Federal
Circuit court’s holding reflects, yet again, the holding of Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm., 582 F.2d 628 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
51
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1358.
47
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presumption of validity, engendered by assertions that under
various circumstances the presumption is retained, destroyed,
strengthened, or weakened, thus resulting in the shifting of the
burden of proof or the changing of the burden of proof.52 After
reviewing the history of the codification of the presumption of
validity, in which Judge Rich played a significant role,53 the court
emphasized that the “attacker” of a patent relying on prior art
already considered by the patent examiner has the added burden of
overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government
agency presumed to have properly done its job.54 In particular,
patent examiners are presumed to have some expertise in
interpreting the prior art and to be familiar with the level of skill in
the art and, in some cases, the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences may have approved of the issuance of the patent.55
The court conceded that when an attacker relies on prior art or
other evidence not already considered by the USPTO, there is no
reason to defer to the USPTO insofar as its effect on validity is
concerned.56 The court nevertheless held that the burden of proof
should still be clear and convincing evidence in this situation.57 In
the court’s view, the production of new prior art not before the
USPTO eliminates, or at least reduces, the element of deference
due the USPTO, thereby partially, if not wholly, discharging the
attacker’s burden, but neither shifting nor lightening it or changing
the burden of proof.58
52

Id. The reference to “prevailing confusion” apparently refers to the consistent, albeit
in the Federal Circuit’s view incorrect, holdings of every other circuit court of appeals.
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.b.
53
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1359 (noting that Judge Rich was one of the
authors of the Patent Act of 1952, which codified the presumption of validity at 35
U.S.C. § 282).
54
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1359.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1360. In this section of the opinion, the court expressly concedes that it is
interpreting the statutory presumption of validity and the statutory language governing
which party has the burden of proof as “different expressions of the same thing.” Id.
Interpreting separate statutory language to mean the same thing, of course, contradicts a
fundamental tenet of statutory construction. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001) (noting the duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute).
58
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1360.
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Notably, the court’s discussion of whether the burden of
persuasion is reduced when an attacker relies upon prior art not
considered by the USPTO appears to be dicta in light of the
challenged jury instruction, which explained that the burden of
proof shifts.59 Furthermore, this dicta, while full of conclusions, is
not supported by any statutory, logical, or policy-based analysis.
Instead, the court appears to be relying solely on a Supreme Court
case, Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc.,60 that
did not even address the situation in which an attacker relies upon
prior art not considered by the USPTO, let alone prior art that is
more relevant than prior art considered by the USPTO.61
Moreover, the court’s discussion of whether the burden of
persuasion is reduced when an attacker relies upon prior art not
considered by the USPTO altogether fails to address the situation
in which that prior art is more relevant than the prior art considered
by the USPTO. Thus, the court avoided this latter situation and
therefore offered no statutory, logical, or policy-based justification
to apply a clear and convincing burden of proof in this situation
either.
f) Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co.
The Federal Circuit reached the question of whether the burden
of proof can be reduced (but not shifted) based on a comparison of
the relevance of prior art asserted in litigation and the relevance of
prior art considered by the USPTO in Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v.
A. Stucki Co.62 The court, in yet another opinion by Chief Judge
Markey, held that the introduction of more pertinent prior art than
that considered by the patent examiner does not entitle the party
asserting invalidity to a jury instruction that its burden can be met
by a preponderance of the evidence.63 In language reminiscent of
many of the cases discussed above, the court maintained that the
presumption of validity is neither weakened nor destroyed where

59

See id.
293 U.S. 1 (1934).
61
See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 725 F.2d at 1360 (citing Radio Corp., 293 U.S.
at 7–8).
62
727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
63
Id.
60
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prior art more pertinent than that considered by the USPTO is
introduced.64 Instead, the court explained, the party challenging
validity is more likely to carry its burden of proving facts clearly
and convincingly under those circumstances.65
Although this was the first opinion by the Federal Circuit
addressing whether the burden on the alleged infringer of proving
invalidity should be less than clear and convincing evidence when
the prior art is more relevant than prior art considered by the
USPTO, the court offered no statutory, logical, or policy-based
justification for its conclusion that the clear and convincing burden
applies.66 Instead, the court relied upon its precedent that traces its
roots to the cases addressed above, none of which addressed this
precise situation and several of which included only dicta on
related circumstances.
2. Modern Treatment of the Standard
Since this series of opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in its
formative years, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly rejected the
contention that the presumption of validity is weakened or
destroyed if there is prior art that is more pertinent than the art
called to the attention of the USPTO.67 Indeed, the Federal Circuit
64

Id.
Id. The court similarly held that the fact that the best mode requirement was not
considered by the examiner did not entitle the party challenging validity to a
preponderance burden of proof. Id.
66
The Federal Circuit subsequently addressed this same issue in Bio-Rad Labs., Inc. v.
Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 615 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d on
other grounds, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., an accused infringer argued
that the jury should have been told that the presumption of validity may be weakened or
destroyed when prior art more pertinent than that considered by the patent examiner is
presented at trial, and that because prior art presented at trial was more pertinent than the
prior art before the patent examiner that the jury should have been instructed that the
accused infringer only had to carry its burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. The court, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Baldwin, rejected these
arguments, holding that the introduction of prior art not considered by the USPTO does
not change the burden of proof or the requirement that evidence establish the
presumption-defeating facts clearly and convincingly. Id. Again, however, the court
failed to articulate any statutory, logical, or policy-based justification for its holding.
67
See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1497–98 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Lear-Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 885–86 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
65
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has maintained the position that invalidity must always be proven
by clear and convincing evidence regardless of any particular
circumstances.68 Thus, even when an invalidity defense is based
on prior art not considered by the USPTO during a patent’s
prosecution, and even if that prior art is more relevant than the
prior art considered by the USPTO, the Federal Circuit still
requires that invalidity be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.69 In short, because the Federal Circuit has held that the
presumption of validity “is never . . . destroyed, or even weakened,
regardless of what facts are of record,”70 it has held that the clear
and convincing burden of proof always applies.
One of the Federal Circuit’s most recent cases addressing
whether the clear and convincing burden of proof applies in every
circumstance is z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.71 There,
the court considered a challenge to a district court’s refusal to
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1459
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
68
See, e.g., Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(holding that the presumption of validity does not dissolve and the burden of proof does
not change during a trial); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556,
1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the clear and convincing burden of proof is
“unvarying” and does not vary depending on the circumstances), overruled on other
grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (en banc); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1574–75
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the presumption of validity “is never . . . destroyed, or even
weakened, regardless of what facts are of record”); see also PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the fact that prior art was
never before the USPTO does not change the presumption of validity); z4 Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a jury instruction
was erroneous because it might lead the jury to believe that the burden of proof is less
than clear and convincing when prior art was not considered by the USPTO). In a recent
Federal Circuit case, the court also noted that the ultimate burden of persuasion “never
shifts” from the party asserting invalidity to the patent owner, however much the burden
of going forward may jump from one party to another. See Tech. Licensing Corp. v.
Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 131 1316, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Unlike the
burden of proof governing invalidity, however, the ultimate burden of persuasion is
expressly recited in 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), and the statute itself indicates that the
ultimate burden of persuasion does not shift from one party to another.
69
See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
70
ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc., 732 F.2d at 1574–75.
71
507 F.3d 1340, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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instruct a jury that the burden of proof on invalidity “is more easily
carried when the [prior art] references on which the assertion is
based were not directly considered by the examiner during
prosecution.”72
The court began its analysis by drawing a distinction between
the proposed instruction’s use of the word “is” and the court’s
view that its precedent indicates only that a party “may” more
easily meet the clear and convincing evidence burden when the
prior art was not before the examiner.73 In the end, the court
rejected the instruction for two additional reasons. First, the court
relied upon the fact that none of its earlier cases required such an
instruction.74 Second, in the court’s view, the instruction might
lead the jury to believe that the burden of proof is less than clear
and convincing when prior art was not considered by the
USPTO.75
The court did not expressly focus on the fact that the
instruction was not limited to prior art that is more pertinent than
the prior art considered by the examiner, but this concept may in
part explain the basis for the court’s opinion. By emphasizing that
its precedent recognizes that a party more easily meets the clear
and convincing evidentiary burden in only some circumstances, the
court may have been making a veiled reference to the circumstance
in which the prior art used in litigation is more relevant than the
prior art used in prosecution.
Regardless, the court’s analysis of the issue before it—which
did not distinguish between more relevant and less relevant prior
art—while perhaps reaching the correct result, is not persuasive.
Reliance on the fact that no case had ever required this particular
jury instruction, of course, is no justification for not allowing it.76
72

Id. at 1354.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1354–55.
76
While not addressing the exact same issue, consider two earlier Federal Circuit
cases. In the first, Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the
Federal Circuit held as erroneous a jury instruction that the burden of proving invalidity
is clear and convincing unless the jury finds that the prior art cited in the litigation is
more pertinent than the prior art cited to the USPTO, in which case the burden is a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 741. According to the court, the “burden is
73
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And the court’s reliance on possible confusion over the applicable
burden of proof based on this instruction actually highlights the
tension between the recognition that when prior art has not been
considered by the USPTO it should be easier to prove invalidity
and the clear and convincing burden of proof itself. While the
court resolved this tension in favor of the clear and convincing
burden of proof, it failed to offer any justification for the
requirement of this stringent a burden in the situation where prior
art has not been considered by the USPTO, let alone where more
relevant prior art is asserted in litigation than has been considered
by the USPTO. Indeed, the court failed even to consider the fact
that almost every opinion discussed above addressing the invalidity
standard indicates that the burden of persuasion is more easily met
when the alleged infringer relies upon prior art that is more
pertinent than the prior art considered by the USPTO.77

permanent and does not change.” Id. In the second, Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5
F.3d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993), however, the Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to the
following jury instruction:
Because the deference to be given the [USPTO]’s determination is
related to the evidence it had before it, you should consider the
evidence presented to the [USPTO] during the reissue application
process, compare it with the evidence you have heard in this case,
and then determine what weight to give the [USPTO]’s
determinations.
Id. at 1563–64. Significantly, the instruction in Mendenhall highlights that the proper
deference due the USPTO depends upon a comparison of the evidence the USPTO had
before it during prosecution and the evidence asserted in litigation. The court concluded
that this instruction concerns administrative correctness, does not undercut the
presumption of validity, is consistent with Federal Circuit precedent, and, ultimately, was
not erroneous. Id. While the court in Mendenhall did not set forth a rule that this
instruction must be used in every case, it is significant that the court did not find this
instruction to be erroneous. Indeed, the logic behind this instruction is consistent with the
application of a lesser burden of proof for unconsidered, material prior art, even though
the court rejected this exact proposition in Medtronic. The Federal Circuit did not refer
to Medtronic or Mendenhall in its opinion in z4 Techs., Inc.
77
See R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983); SSIH Equip.
S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Stratoflex, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 632 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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B. The Rationale: The United States Patent and Trademark Office
Presumably Considers the Most Relevant Prior Art
The Federal Circuit relies on the statutory presumption of
validity expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 282 as justification for requiring
clear and convincing evidence of invalidity in every
circumstance.78 This presumption recognizes the deference that is
due to a qualified government agency presumed to have performed
its job correctly.79 In this context, for example, the court presumes
that examiners have some expertise in interpreting the prior art and
are familiar with the level of skill in the art.80
For this rationale to justify a rule that the clear and convincing
burden of proof applies in every circumstance, however, the court
must presume that examiners search, find, and consider the most
relevant prior art, compare the claims of patent applications with
the most relevant prior art, and allow only valid claims to issue as
patents over the most relevant prior art.81 In other words, the only
reasonable rationale for the Federal Circuit’s strict standard of
requiring clear and convincing evidence in every situation is that
the USPTO is presumed to have considered the most relevant prior
art and still allowed the patent application to issue as a patent.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S STANDARD FOR
PROVING INVALIDITY
There are several problems associated with requiring clear and
convincing evidence to prove invalidity in all instances. As a
logical matter, the only rationale for applying a clear and
78

See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
79
Id. at 1359.
80
Id.; see also Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“The ‘presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 carries with it a presumption that
the Examiner did his duty and knew what claims he was allowing.’” (quoting Intervet
Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).
81
Cf. Wm. Redin Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of
Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950, 951 (1942) (explaining that the reasoning
behind awarding patents—that the patent does not take from the public anything that it
had before the invention, while its profitability often bears a reasonable relation to the
public benefit from the invention—“is wholly valid only if the [USPTO] is aware of all
existing and past industrial practices”).
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convincing burden of proof in every instance fails to justify the
scope of the Federal Circuit’s application of that standard. As a
factual matter, the standard is based on incorrect assumptions. In
terms of incentives, the standard fails to provide proper incentives
to patent owners to disclose prior art to the USPTO. And in terms
of results, the standard negatively affects patent quality, unjustly
rewards patent applicants, and creates unnecessary transaction
costs.
A. The Standard and the Rationale Are Not Coextensive
As a logical matter, the only rationale for applying a clear and
convincing burden of proof in every instance—that the USPTO
always considers the most relevant prior art—fails to justify
applying this burden of proof when the prior art presented in
litigation is more relevant than the prior art considered by the
USPTO. In other words, the rationale for the Federal Circuit’s
standard and the standard itself are not coextensive. When the
presumption that the USPTO has considered the most relevant
prior art is proven incorrect, why should the Federal Circuit’s
application of that presumption—the clear and convincing burden
of proof—continue to apply? As a logical matter, it should not.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has failed to explain any logical
rationale behind enforcing the clear and convincing burden of
proof when the presumption that the USPTO considered the most
relevant prior art is proven false.
B. The Standard Is Based on Incorrect Assumptions
As a factual matter, the Federal Circuit’s standard is based on
incorrect assumptions. The USPTO likely does not always—or
even usually—find and consider the most relevant prior art. There
are several bases for this conclusion: information asymmetry
between patent applicants and the USPTO, the lack of incentives
for examiners to find the most relevant prior art, the USPTO’s
limited resources, and the fact that patent prosecution largely is an
ex parte procedure that excludes public participation.
Information asymmetry exists between patent applicants and
the USPTO. Inventors typically know more about their own field
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of technology than do the examiners at the USPTO.82 Inventors
normally have better information concerning the date of their
invention, any barring activities, and at least some of the prior art,
particularly prior products and industry publications. Unless the
inventors voluntarily provide the USPTO with this information or
such information is obtained by performing searches on public
information, examiners likely do not consider the most relevant
information concerning patentability. By contrast, in litigation the
alleged infringer has all of the tools of discovery to obtain this
information; its disclosure does not depend on the good faith of
patent applicants.
Examiners at the USPTO lack incentives to find the most
relevant prior art. Particularly as compared to alleged infringers
that wish to avoid paying damages or royalties to the patent owner
or being enjoined from practicing the patented technology,
examiners at the USPTO have little externally-imposed incentive
to find the most relevant prior art.83 In light of the disparity
between the incentives on alleged infringers and examiners, it is
more likely that alleged infringers find the most relevant prior art.
The USPTO has limited resources. Patent examiners spend an
extremely short amount of time searching for prior art.84 And they
do not necessarily have the best access to prior art databases.85 In
82

See Abbot Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that
“the patent practice includes recognition that the inventor usually knows more about the
field than does the ‘expert’ patent examiner”).
83
See Turzillo v. P. & Z. Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[T]he
proceeding before the [USPTO] . . . is dependent upon examination by an official . . .
who does not have the extra spark of an economic incentive to avoid the tribute or other
restraint that may be exacted by a patentee.”).
84
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 5, at 5 (2003) (indicating that “panelists
varied in their estimates of the amount of time available to examine an application from
start to finish, but all indicated that it was very short” and that the examination included
reading and understanding the application, searching for prior art, evaluating
patentability, communicating with the applicant, working out necessary revisions, and
reaching and writing up conclusions).
85
In his dissent in Diamond v. Diehr, Justice Stevens noted that the President’s
Commission on the Patent System recommended against patent protection for computer
programs at least in part because of the lack of requisite search files. Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 218 n.45 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Without the ability to search the
prior art, the Commission concluded that the patenting of computer programs would be
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litigation, on the other hand, alleged infringers often will go to the
ends of the earth—sometimes literally—to find prior art due to the
relatively strong incentive to find the most relevant prior art and
relatively weak constraints in terms of dollars and time.
Comparing the resources available to patent examiners and alleged
infringers suggests, again, that alleged infringers are more likely to
find the most relevant prior art.
Patent prosecution mostly is an ex parte procedure that
excludes public participation.86 As a result, the public remains
largely unable to identify and disclose prior art to the USPTO.87 In
litigation, by contrast, there are no restrictions on the public’s
ability to identify and submit prior art to alleged infringers for
potential use. And even if third parties do not voluntarily assist
accused infringers to find prior art, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide litigation counsel with subpoena power to
compel third parties to produce documents and provide testimony
regarding prior art.88 Thus, the ability of alleged infringers to
utilize the public to search for and find prior art provides alleged
infringers with an advantage over the USPTO.
In light of all of these factors, and particularly when compared
to alleged infringers embroiled in litigation, the USPTO is less
likely to find and consider the most relevant prior art.
C. The Standard Creates Improper Incentives
In terms of incentives, applying the clear and convincing
burden of proof regardless of whether the USPTO actually
considered the most relevant prior art discourages patent applicants
from investigating prior art, and therefore from potentially finding
tantamount to mere registration and “the presumption of validity would be all but
nonexistent.” Id.
86
Inter partes reexamination is one exception to the rule. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§
311–18 (2006).
87
An exception is the ability of third parties, within the first two years after the
publication of a patent application, to submit to the USPTO prior art in the form of
patents and printed publications. 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2008). These submissions, however,
“shall not include any explanation of the patents or publications, or any other
information” such as prior art in the form of prior sales of products. Id. Moreover, these
submissions are “limited to ten total patents or publications.” Id.
88
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
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and disclosing the most relevant prior art to the USPTO. During
prosecution at the USPTO, the burden of proving invalidity is by a
preponderance of the evidence.89 All else being equal, a rational
patent applicant who desires patent protection would prefer to have
the invalidity of his or her claims decided, not under the
preponderance burden of proof, but under the more stringent clear
and convincing burden of proof. But if the patent applicant learns
about relevant prior art, the inequitable conduct defense90—and the
specter of its remedy of unenforceability and potential attorneys’
fees91—provides an overwhelming incentive for the patent
applicant to disclose this relevant prior art to the USPTO. A
rational patent applicant, therefore, may altogether avoid learning
about potentially relevant prior art, for example by not searching
for prior art until after a patent application issues as a patent.92 By
doing so, the patent applicant may avoid both the preponderance
burden of proof for invalidity and the remedies of the inequitable
conduct defense. Thus, applying the clear and convincing burden
without regard to whether the most relevant prior art has been
considered by the USPTO creates a perverse incentive for patent
applicants not to find and disclose relevant prior art to the USPTO.
The public, however, would benefit if the patent owner would
search for prior art and disclose the most relevant prior art to the
USPTO. Indeed, this behavior would fortify the presumption upon
89

In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee breaches his or her ‘duty of candor,
good faith, and honesty’ to the [US]PTO.” (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d
1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995))).
91
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 285 (2006)). The remedy for a finding of inequitable conduct
with respect to one or more claims of a patent application is unenforceability of the entire
patent. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (relevant portion en banc). In addition, related patents also may be held
unenforceable. Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1227, 1230 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
92
Generally speaking, there is not a requirement that patent applicants search for prior
art. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2006) (listing the requirements for a non-provisional patent
application). One exception is when a patent applicant desires to accelerate prosecution
of an application. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 708.02 (8th ed. 2001, Jul. 2008 rev.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm.
90
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which the clear and convincing burden of proof is based. In short,
the Federal Circuit’s standard is self-defeating—the standard itself
undermines the very presumption on which it relies: that the
USPTO considered the most relevant prior art.93
D. Poor Patent Quality, Unjust Rewards, and Unnecessary Costs
In terms of results, the Federal Circuit’s standard negatively
affects patent quality, unjustly rewards patent applicants, and
creates unnecessary transaction costs. The primary effect of the
incentive structure discussed above—encouraging patent
applicants not to search for and disclose prior art to the USPTO—
is a reduction in the quality of patents in terms of their validity. To
the extent that the USPTO does not consider the most relevant
prior art before allowing patent applications to issue as patents, the
validity of the issued patents is undetermined. Indeed, the perverse
incentive created by the application of the clear and convincing
burden of proof at all times likely results in the awarding of at least
some, and perhaps many, patents to applicants that would not
otherwise obtain protection for their disclosure.
In this situation, the quid pro quo at the very heart of the patent
system is turned on its head. The patent applicant discloses
nothing new or nonobvious but nevertheless receives a reward for
his or her disclosure.94 The patent owner may charge a premium
for a product or service and collect monopoly profits despite his or
her failure to provide beneficial disclosure to the public. In other
words, patent applicants are unjustly rewarded, and the
constitutional purpose of patents—to promote the progress of
science and useful arts95—is thwarted.
This unjust award of a patent comes at a significant cost. To
the extent that the patent owner is able to collect monopoly profits,
these profits are at the public’s expense. In addition, competitors
93

One proposal that would address this misalignment is to “grant a presumption of
validity” only when prior art is disclosed to the USPTO. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and
Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 770–76 (2002). In
the context of this proposal, the elimination of the grant of a presumption of validity
involves lowering the burden of proof below clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 776.
94
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b).
95
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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may be required to raise prices on their own products or services to
offset the cost of negotiating license agreements or litigation with
the patent owner. Litigation of ultimately invalid patents may be
required, costing significant sums of money to the parties as well
as the public in terms of the costs of the judicial process.96
Moreover, to the extent that the standard for proving invalidity in
litigation is too strict, a patent that might never have been issued
by the USPTO may ultimately survive a challenge to its validity.
In short, the anticompetitive costs of a patent may be unleashed on
the public, either temporarily or “permanently,”97 when those costs
could have been prevented by the USPTO had it made a more fully
informed decision regarding the patentability of the patent
application in the first instance.
III. REPLACING THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING BURDEN WITH A
PREPONDERANCE BURDEN FOR UNCONSIDERED,
MATERIAL PRIOR ART
To correct for the significant problems associated with the
Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity—including its
logical shortcomings, incorrect assumptions, perverse incentives,
negative effects on patent quality, unjust rewards, and unnecessary
transaction costs—that standard, which requires clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity in every circumstance, should be
replaced with a preponderance burden of proof when the USPTO
did not consider material prior art.

96
In 2009, the median total cost to the parties of a patent infringement lawsuit with
between $1 million and $25 million at risk was $2.5 million. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N,
2009 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2009). This cost, while high, does not count
the expenses borne by juries and courts. Id.
97
The “temporary” effects of a patent in this situation refers to the time period
between which the USPTO issues the patent and the patent is finally invalidated in court.
The “permanent” effects of a patent in this situation refers to the time period between
which the USPTO issues the patent and the patent expires at the conclusion of its the
statutory term—now twenty years from the date on which the patent application was filed
in the United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
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A. The Concept: A Preponderance Burden for Unconsidered,
Material Prior Art
The Federal Circuit’s standard, which requires clear and
convincing evidence to prove invalidity in every circumstance,
should be replaced with a standard that reflects whether the
USPTO actually considered the most relevant prior art at the time
the patent was issued. If an alleged infringer asserts unconsidered
and material prior art in litigation, the preponderance burden of
proof should apply to the question of invalidity. Otherwise, the
clear and convincing burden of proof should apply.
1. “Unconsidered” Prior Art
Under this proposal, a first threshold determination would be
whether the prior art asserted in litigation has been considered by
the USPTO. Only if the prior art was not considered by the
USPTO would the preponderance burden of proof potentially
apply. Consideration of prior art by the USPTO could be
determined, in the first instance, by reference to the face of the
patent at issue. The “References Cited” section of every patent
will identify prior art considered by the USPTO.98
The
prosecution history, however, also should be consulted to
determine whether the USPTO considered additional prior art
references that, due to an error, were omitted from the face of the
patent.
The view that the only references considered by the USPTO
are those cited on the face of patents was criticized in Solder
Removal Co. There, the court noted that the USPTO’s failure to
cite particular prior art does not necessarily mean that that prior art
was not considered by the examiner because the examiner may
have considered it and determined that it was unworthy of
citation.99 The court did not cite any support for this proposition.
98

See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1302.12 (8th ed. 2001, Jul. 2008 rev.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm. The references listed on the face of the issued patent
include references cited by the patent applicant in Information Disclosure Statements and
references cited by the patent examiner on form PTO-892. Id.
99
Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d 628, 633 n.9 (C.C.P.A.
1978).

C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

320

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

3/15/2011 10:20 PM

[Vol. 21:293

Moreover, even if the failure to cite particular prior art does not
necessarily mean that that prior art was not considered by the
examiner, it seems more likely than not that in most situations
when an examiner does not cite particular prior art, the failure to
cite that prior art means that that it was not considered by the
examiner. Thus, in terms of setting a default rule, it makes more
sense to presume that prior art references not cited on the face of a
patent were not considered by the USPTO. Indeed, in Connell, the
Federal Circuit conceded that there is virtually always pertinent
and relevant prior art not considered by the USPTO.100 A default
rule should not presume the opposite.101
2. “Material” Prior Art
If the prior art asserted in litigation has not been considered by
the USPTO, a second threshold determination would be made:
whether the unconsidered prior art is material to patentability.102
This materiality analysis should include two prongs. First, a
determination should be made concerning whether the prior art is
relevant to the claimed invention. For example, information
should be considered material “where there is a substantial
100

Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Others have proposed an alternative reform that would modify the burden of proving
invalidity based on the extent to which the USPTO has considered any particular prior
art. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 49–51 (2007) (proposing a preponderance burden of proof
for traditional USPTO consideration of prior art and a clear and convincing burden of
proof for enhanced USPTO consideration of prior art). That proposal would require the
implementation of new USPTO procedures to obtain an enhanced burden of proof,
regardless of prior consideration of prior art by the USPTO. Id. The reform proposed
here would not require implementation of any new USPTO procedures.
102
Materiality is a concept central to the issue of inequitable conduct, and in the context
of inequitable conduct it can be measured under various standards: (1) a “subjective but
for” standard; (2) an “objective but for” standard; (3) a “but it may have” standard; (4)
the reasonable examiner standard; and (5) the standard currently set by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Some of these standards are more strict than others. In the context of gauging the
relevance of prior art for purposes of setting the invalidity standard, the relevant issues
are whether the prior art is relevant and non-cumulative, as discussed below. And while
any of these standards could be adopted for purposes of the invalidity analysis, note that
the reasonable examiner standard is the least difficult to satisfy, while the standard
currently set by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 already expressly includes the concept of noncumulativeness.
101
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likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important
in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent.”103
Only if the prior art asserted in litigation is
“important,” or relevant, would the preponderance burden of proof
potentially apply.
Second, an analysis should be made concerning whether the
prior art is cumulative to prior art already considered by the
USPTO.
“Cumulativeness” refers to the situation where
information teaches no more than what a reasonable examiner
would consider to be taught by prior art already before the
USPTO.104 Non-cumulativeness, then, refers to the situation
where information teaches more than what a reasonable examiner
would consider to be taught by prior art already before the USPTO.
Only if the prior art asserted in litigation is non-cumulative should
the preponderance burden of proof potentially apply.
Applying these concepts, if prior art asserted in litigation (1)
was not considered by the USPTO and is both (2)(a) relevant to the
claimed invention and (2)(b) non-cumulative, then the
preponderance burden of proof should apply to the question of
invalidity. On the other hand, if prior art asserted in litigation (1)
was considered by the USPTO or is either (2)(a) not relevant to the
claimed invention or (2)(b) cumulative, then the clear and
convincing burden of proof should apply to the question of
invalidity. Stated more concisely, this proposal would replace the
clear and convincing burden of proof with a preponderance burden
of proof when the USPTO did not consider material prior art.105
103

37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991). This is the reasonable examiner standard of materiality.
University of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
105
Some have advocated this same position—that the proper evidentiary burden is
preponderance of the evidence when material evidence was not considered by the
USPTO. See, e.g., Charles E. Phipps, The Presumption of Administrative Correctness:
The Proper Basis for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 10 FED. CIR. B.J.
143, 162 (2000). Others, however, have proposed applying the preponderance burden of
proof when prior art asserted in litigation raises a “substantial new question of
patentability.” See, e.g., Clarence J. Fleming, Should the Clear & Convincing Evidence
Standard for Rebutting the Presumption of Validity Apply when the Challenger Raises a
Substantial New Question of Patentability?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 146,
149 (1998). The “substantial new question of patentability” test—used by the USPTO to
determine whether to grant a request for reexamination pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 304—has
proven unworkable in practice. The USPTO almost always finds a “substantial new
104
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3. Who Determines Which Burden of Proof Applies?
There are two possible answers to the question of who would
determine which burden of proof to apply: the jury or the trial
judge. There are also two possible approaches to determining
whether the jury or the trial judge will make this decision.
One approach would allow the factfinder on the ultimate
invalidity issue to determine which burden of proof to apply.
Anticipation is a question of fact.106 Thus, a jury might be
provided instructions on how to determine whether to apply the
clear and convincing burden of proof or the preponderance burden
of proof.107 Obviousness, however, is a question of law based on
underlying questions of fact.108 Sometimes juries are called upon
to answer the ultimate question of whether a patent claim is
obvious, and other times juries are only given special
interrogatories on the underlying factual questions with the trial
question of patentability.” See, e.g., UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA—MARCH 31, 2010, available at http://
reexamcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010-03-31-Ex-Parte.pdf (indicating that
the USPTO grants requests for ex parte reexamination more than 90% of the time). The
problem with the “substantial new question of patentability” test may be that it does not
expressly take into account whether new prior art is cumulative compared to prior art
already resolved by the USPTO.
106
Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
107
One practitioner, citing Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir.
2004), has advocated the opposite position: omitting any jury instruction regarding the
presumption of validity and limiting the court’s instruction to the admonition that the
alleged infringer has the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
David C. Bohrer, Knocking the Eagle Off the Patent Owner’s Shoulder: Chiron Holds
that Jurors Don’t Have to be Told that a Patent Is Presumed Valid, 21 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 259, 284–85 (2004). This position, however, is based on
an unsupported assumption that, when the jury is left in the dark regarding the
presumption of validity, the jury “will have little or no understanding of how much
evidence is required” to satisfy the clear and convincing standard, and therefore that the
alleged infringer will find it “much easier to convince the jury” to invalidate patents. Id.
Moreover, it is based on a questionable belief that the jury will reject the judge’s
instruction on the burden of proof and set a lower hurdle for the alleged infringer: “If the
jury does not understand the reasons for shifting burdens and higher standards, the
likelihood is that the jury would set the hurdle much lower than they would if they knew
the full story.” Id. at 285. Instructing the jury on “the full story”—and in particular
instructing the jury to apply a preponderance burden of proof when prior art has not been
considered by the USPTO—quite obviously would make it much more likely that a jury
actually applies this lower hurdle to the question of invalidity when appropriate.
108
Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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judge deciding in the first instance the ultimate question of whether
a patent claim is obvious.109 In the former circumstance, the
jury—again through the use of jury instructions—might be tasked
with determining which burden of proof to apply.110 In the latter
circumstance, the trial judge would take on this task.
An alternative approach would allow the trial judge to
determine which burden of proof the ultimate factfinder should
apply. The trial judge always would decide the appropriate burden
of proof under this alternative implementation and instruct the jury
to apply that burden of proof on anticipation and, to the extent the
issue is put to the jury, obviousness.
B. The Support
There is logical and precedential support for the application of
a preponderance burden of proof when the USPTO does not
consider material prior art. This proposal would make the standard
and its appropriate rationale coextensive, recognize the realities of
examination of patent applications by the USPTO, and reflect the
precedent of the Supreme Court and every other circuit court of
appeals.

109
See, e.g., The National Jury Instruction Project, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§§ 5.9–10 (2009), available at http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org (providing
separate model jury instructions for instances in which the jury will rule upon the
ultimate issue of obviousness and instances in which the jury will answer only special
interrogatories regarding the underlying factual issues).
110
For example, a jury instruction adopting this proposed reform might recite:
If you find that prior art asserted in this case was not considered by
the USPTO, is relevant to the claimed invention, and is not
cumulative, then you should apply the preponderance burden of proof
to the question of invalidity. On the other hand, if you find that prior
art asserted in this case was considered by the USPTO or is not
relevant to the claimed invention or is cumulative, then you should
apply the clear and convincing burden of proof to the question of
invalidity. Prior art is cumulative where that prior art teaches no
more than what a reasonable examiner would consider to be taught
by prior art already considered by the USPTO.
The complexity of this jury instruction is a factor favoring an implementation in which
the trial judge selects the appropriate burden of proof.
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1. Making the Standard and Its Rationale Coextensive
The rationale behind the decision of which burden of proof to
apply to the issue of invalidity is twofold: (1) that the USPTO
correctly rules upon evidence in front of it and (2) that a patent
applicant is entitled to a patent only if the applicant’s claims
cannot be proven invalid in the first instance by a preponderance of
the evidence. Applying the clear and convincing burden of
proof—when the USPTO has already considered the same prior art
relied upon in litigation or prior art just as relevant as the prior art
relied upon in litigation—would reflect the belief that the USPTO,
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, correctly
ruled upon the validity of the patent application in light of the
evidence in front of it. On the other hand, applying the
preponderance burden of proof—when the USPTO has not already
considered prior art relied upon in litigation and that prior art is
more relevant than the prior art the USPTO did consider—would
reflect the belief that a patent applicant is entitled to a patent in the
first instance only if invalidity of the applicant’s claims cannot be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence. In short, this proposal
would make the standard and its appropriate rationale coextensive.
The first part of the rationale, that the USPTO correctly rules
upon the validity of the patent application in light of the evidence
in front of it, is articulated in Federal Circuit cases. In American
Hoist & Derrick Co., for example, the court focused on the
deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed
to have properly done its job, but conceded that when an attacker
relies on prior art or other evidence not already considered by the
USPTO, there is no reason for deference.111 While this analysis
alone does not support the Federal Circuit’s invalidity standard—
applying the clear and convincing burden of proof in every
instance, regardless of whether the attacker relies on better prior art
than the prior art considered by the USPTO—this analysis supports
applying the clear and convincing burden of proof when the
USPTO has already considered the same prior art relied upon in
litigation or prior art just as relevant as the prior art relied upon in
111
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1984).

C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CLEAR BUT UNCONVINCING

3/15/2011 10:20 PM

325

litigation.112 Built into this first part of the rationale, of course, is
the understanding that the USPTO does not always consider the
most relevant, and certainly not all of the, prior art.113
The second part of the rationale, that a patent applicant is
entitled to a patent only if the applicant’s claims cannot be proven
invalid in the first instance by a preponderance of the evidence,
also is supported by Federal Circuit cases. The Federal Circuit has
held that, during prosecution, the USPTO must prove invalidity by
a preponderance of the evidence.114
Thus, when patent
applications are reviewed in the first instance, the burden for
proving that the statutory requirements of patentability are not met
is a preponderance of the evidence.115 Moreover, in the absence of
a statutory presumption of validity, the Federal Circuit would
apply a preponderance burden of proof to invalidity issues raised in
litigation.116
The Federal Circuit, however, has interpreted the statutory
presumption of validity as mandating that the clear and convincing
burden of proof applies regardless of any other consideration.117
112

For this rationale to support the Federal Circuit’s standard, a false presumption must
be made that the USPTO considers the most relevant prior art. See discussion supra Part
II.B.
113
See Woodward, supra note 81, at 959 (highlighting problems associated with the
“failure to realize fully that the American patent system . . . leaves to private litigation the
resolution of vital matters of fact that rarely appear in commensurate fullness in [USPTO]
proceedings—if indeed they are involved there at all—and that consequently the decision
on the issue of patent validity in an infringement suit is not simply judicial review of
administrative findings”).
114
In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
115
Id.
116
The Federal Circuit has indicated that invalidity for lack of written description is
proven by a preponderance of the evidence due to the lack of a statutory presumption
with respect to patent applications. See Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d
1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2004). Similarly, the court has held that the presumption of validity does not
apply to patents involved in interference proceedings, resulting in the application of
burden of proof of a preponderance of the evidence, unless it is a priority contest between
an issued patent and an application that was filed after the issuance of the patent. Apotex
U.S., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1037 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bruning v. Hirose,
161 F.3d 681, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1193–94 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
117
See Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding
that the presumption of validity does not dissolve and the burden of proof does not
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To the extent that the presumption of validity even addresses the
appropriate burden of proof,118 the presumption of validity should
be interpreted and understood to mean that, in the absence of clear
proof to the contrary, the USPTO correctly rules upon evidence in
front of it. It should not be interpreted to mean, contrary to reality
and in an irrebuttable fashion, that the USPTO always considers
the most relevant prior art. As discussed below, interpreting the
presumption of validity to mean that, in the absence of clear proof
to the contrary, the USPTO correctly rules upon evidence in front
of it, is more consistent with reality, Supreme Court precedent, and
the law of every other circuit court of appeals.
2. Recognizing the Realities of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office Examination
Adoption of a standard that applies the preponderance burden
of proof on the issue of invalidity when a determination has been
made that the USPTO did not consider the most relevant prior art
would recognize the realities of the examination of patent
applications by the USPTO. As discussed above, the USPTO
likely does not always, or even usually, find and consider the most
relevant prior art due to the information asymmetry between patent
applicants and the USPTO, the lack of incentives for examiners to
find the most relevant prior art, the USPTO’s limited resources,
and the fact that patent prosecution largely is an ex parte procedure
that excludes public participation.119 Because it is likely that
litigation often involves an analysis of the patentability of patent
claims based on evidence considered in the first instance, the law

change during a trial); Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 756 F.2d 1556,
1559–60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the clear and convincing burden of proof is
“unvarying” and does not change depending on the circumstances), overruled on other
grounds by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038–39
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572,
1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the presumption of validity “is never . . .
destroyed, or even weakened, regardless of what facts are of record”).
118
Again, note that some have argued that the presumption of validity simply puts the
initial burden of coming forward with evidence on the issue of validity on the alleged
infringer. See, e.g., B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement
Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 380 (2008).
119
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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should allow the invalidity analysis to proceed under the
preponderance burden of proof in that circumstance.
3. Precedent
The Federal Circuit appears to rely on two bases for its
requirement that clear and convincing evidence be shown in every
instance to prove invalidity: (1) Supreme Court precedent
supposedly requiring this standard and (2) the statutory
presumption of validity expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 282.120 Neither
basis has merit. The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
proper interpretation of the presumption of validity and the proper
burden of proof when more relevant prior art is asserted in
litigation than the prior art considered by the USPTO.121
Furthermore, the “social disutility” analysis the Supreme Court
uses to determine appropriate burdens of proof supports the
application of the preponderance standard in this situation.
Moreover, the other circuit courts that have interpreted the
statutory presumption of validity effectively have concluded that it
120

See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (citing Radio Corp. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1934)
(interpreting the statutory presumption of validity)).
121
Shortly before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in i4i
Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W.
3128 (Nov. 29, 2010) (No. 10-290). This case may squarely address the issues raised in
this Article, as shown by Microsoft’s petition for writ of certiorari:
The Patent Act provides that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid” and
that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. §
282. The Federal Circuit held below that Microsoft was required to
prove its defense of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) by “clear and
convincing evidence,” even though the prior art on which the
invalidity defense rests was not considered by the Patent and
Trademark Office prior to the issuance of the asserted patent. The
question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding
that Microsoft’s invalidity defense must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp. (No. 10-290), 2010 WL
3413088, at *ii (Aug. 27, 2010). As this Article explains, the Supreme Court should
require consideration of not just whether the USPTO considered during the original
prosecution the prior art raised in litigation, but also whether that prior art is material
when compared to the prior art the USPTO did consider during prosecution. When prior
art was not considered and is material, then the preponderance burden, not the clear and
convincing burden, should apply.
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requires only a presumption that the USPTO correctly ruled upon
the evidence in front of it—not that the USPTO considered the
most relevant prior art or that it, illogically, correctly ruled upon
evidence that it did not even consider. Indeed, some of the other
circuit courts have concluded that the preponderance burden of
proof applies when more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation
than the prior art considered by the USPTO.
a) Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the proper
interpretation of the presumption of validity or the proper burden
of proof when more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation than
the prior art considered by the USPTO. Yet there is reason to
believe that, if it did, it might adopt a preponderance standard in
this situation.
i. Supreme Court Opinions Prior to Radio Corp. v. Radio
Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
Prior to its decision in the oft-cited case of Radio Corp., the
Supreme Court issued a multitude of opinions that addressed the
presumption of validity.122 Significantly, those cases do not attach
122

See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 348
(1924) (“The patent of the exclusive right against the public carries with it a presumption
of its validity. It is not conclusive but the presumption gives the grant substance and
value.” (citation omitted)); Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 71
(1885) (“In reaching this conclusion, we have allowed its due weight to the presumption
in favor of the validity of the patent arising from the action of the patent-office in
granting it . . . .”); Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 662 (1879) (“Where the patent in
suit is introduced in evidence it affords a prima facie presumption that the invention is
new and useful . . . .”); Roemer v. Simon, 95 U.S. 214, 215 (1877) (“Patentees or
assignees in a suit for infringement, where the patent described in the bill of complaint is
introduced in evidence, are presumed to be the original and first inventors of the
described improvement; and, if they have proved the alleged infringement, the burden of
proof is cast upon the respondents to show that the patent is invalid, unless the patent is
materially defective in form.”); Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486,
499 (1876) (“To sustain this position the defendant must overcome the presumption
against him arising from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents . . . .”); Mitchell v.
Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 390 (1873) (“Power to issue letters-patent is conferred
upon the commissioner of patents, and inasmuch as such grants are executed by public
authority and in pursuance of an act of Congress, the rule is that the patent, when
introduced in evidence by the complaining party in a suit for infringement, affords a
prima facie presumption that the patentee is the original and first inventor of what is
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any particular burden of proving invalidity to this presumption of
validity, nor do they address the question of whether the burden of
proof changes when more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation
than the prior art considered by the USPTO.
One of the earliest of these cases is Philadelphia & Trenton
Railroad Co. v. Stimpson.123 While the Court did not address the
particular burden of proof required to prove that a patent is invalid,
it did highlight that the presumption of validity is dependent upon
whether the evidence was “laid before the officer”—that is,
presented to the USPTO. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Story, explained that there is a presumption of compliance with the
patent laws upon issuance of the patent itself.124 According to the
Court, the fact that a public officer has granted a patent is prima
facie evidence that the requirements of the patent laws have been
met, and no other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or controvert
the satisfaction of these requirements if the evidence was laid
before the officer.125 In addition to deeming a patent on an
invention to be prima facie evidence of compliance with the patent

therein described and claimed as his invention.”); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 516, 538–39 (1870) (“Power to grant letters patent is conferred by law upon the
Commissioner of Patents, and when that power has been lawfully exercised, and a patent
has been duly granted, it is of itself prima facie evidence that the patentee is the original
and first inventor of that which is therein described, and secured to him as his invention. .
. . [The] effect as evidence is to cast the burden of proof upon the respondents to show
that the respective patentees are not the original and first inventors of the improvements
embodied in the several letters patent . . . .”); Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
583, 596–97 (1868) (“[T]he rule of law is that the letters patent afford a prima facie
presumption that the patentee is the original and first inventor of what is therein described
as his improvement. . . . Application for a patent is required to be made to the
commissioner appointed under authority of law, and inasmuch as that officer is
empowered to decide upon the merits of the application, his decision in granting the
patent is presumed to be correct.”); Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. Co. v. Stimpson, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 448, 459 (1840) (noting that “[p]atents for lands, equally with patents for
inventions, have been deemed prima facie evidence that they were regularly granted”).
123
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 448 (1840).
124
Id. at 458.
125
Id. The Court would later reject the proposition that the decisions of the USPTO are
conclusive and not open to examination in the courts. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S.
347, 354–55 (1875). Instead, the Court explained that “the allowance and issuance of a
patent creates a prima facie right only” and “the validity of the patent is subject to an
examination by the courts.” Id.
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laws,126 the Court noted that, in light of the requirement that patent
applicants provide an oath asserting that the inventor is the first
inventor, courts in this country have deemed the patent’s issuance
prima facie evidence that the inventor is in fact the first inventor.127
Later, in Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp.,128
the Supreme Court addressed the argument that a patent secured by
false evidence is not entitled to the presumption of validity.129 The
Court rejected this argument, but only because the false evidence
did not form the basis for the granting of the patent, nor was it
“essentially material” to the patent’s issuance.130 As a result, the
Court concluded that the “presumption of validity furnished by the
grant of the patent . . . would not seem to be destroyed.”131 In this
way, the Court implied that the presumption of validity would be
“destroyed” if false evidence was “essentially material” to the
patent’s issuance. While limited to the introduction of “essentially
material” false evidence, the holding leaves open the possibility
that the withholding of “essentially material” prior art similarly
would “destroy” the presumption of validity. Moreover, this
holding indicates that the presumption of validity is not absolute
but can be eliminated in certain circumstances.
Thus, at least some Supreme Court opinions prior to Radio
Corp. indicate that the presumption of validity depends upon
whether prior art was presented to the USPTO and that the
presumption of validity may be “destroyed” in some
circumstances.

126

The Court compared patents for inventions with patents for lands, which when
produced “under the great seal of the government” have been deemed prima facie
evidence that they were regularly granted without any evidence that the law’s
prerequisites were met. Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. Co., 39 U.S. at 459.
127
Id. But see Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 543 (1870) (explaining
that, pursuant to a subsequent statute, “the fact of the granting of [a] reissued patent
closed all inquiry into the existence of inadvertence, accident, or mistake”).
128
276 U.S. 358 (1928).
129
Id. at 373–74.
130
Id. at 374.
131
Id.
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ii. Radio Corp. v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
The Federal Circuit has relied upon the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Radio Corp. as supporting the proposition that the
burden of proof for invalidity does not change and requires clear
and convincing evidence.132
It is important, therefore, to
understand the context in which the Supreme Court considered the
appropriate burden of proof to apply to the question of invalidity.
That context reveals that the Supreme Court was not presented
with the question of whether the burden of proof changes when
more relevant prior art is asserted in litigation compared to the
prior art considered by the USPTO. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court was addressing a case in which the same invalidity issue was
being raised for the fourth time—and one of the prior cases
resolved an interference proceeding between the parties at the
USPTO.
In Radio Corp., the Court faced a longstanding dispute
between two inventors, Armstrong and De Forest, over which one
of them was the first inventor and thus entitled to patent protection
over their invention.133 The Court’s opinion provides a detailed
explanation of the long history of the dispute between Armstrong
and De Forest, including both an interference proceeding at the
USPTO and litigation in various courts.134
Four separate
proceedings pitted Armstrong’s priority claim against De Forest’s
priority claim: (1) an infringement lawsuit commenced by
Armstrong; (2) an interference proceeding involving patent
applications filed by Armstrong and De Forest; (3) a declaratory
judgment action brought by De Forest; and (4) an infringement
lawsuit filed by De Forest.135
The first proceeding, the infringement lawsuit filed by
Armstrong, related to a patent that had issued from a first patent
application filed by Armstrong, and it resulted in an interlocutory

132
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Radio Corp. is one of the two bases for the Federal Circuit’s invalidity standard.
The other basis is the statutory presumption of validity. Id. at 1359–60.
133
Radio Corp. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1934).
134
Id. at 2–7.
135
Id.
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finding on the issue of priority in favor of Armstrong that was
affirmed by the Second Circuit.136
The second proceeding, the interference, involved a second
patent application filed by Armstrong, and it resulted in a finding
by the Commissioner of Patents giving Armstrong priority.137 The
D.C. Circuit, however, reversed and decreed priority in favor of De
Forest.138
In the third proceeding, the declaratory judgment action, De
Forest sought to invalidate Armstrong’s patent that had issued
from the first patent application in light of the holding of the D.C.
Circuit.139 De Forest succeeded in the district court on the basis
that Armstrong failed to overcome the presumption of validity
attaching to the De Forest patents in light of the administrative
ruling in the D.C. Circuit and the fact that the Second Circuit had
only affirmed an interlocutory finding related to Armstrong’s first
patent application, i.e., that no final judgment had been entered.140
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Armstrong had not
overcome the presumption of validity attaching to De Forest’s
patents.141 The Supreme Court affirmed in light of two lines of
cases.142 The first holds that a decision by the USPTO between
two parties as to priority “must be accepted as controlling upon
that question of fact in any subsequent suit between the same
parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony [that] in
character and amount carries thorough conviction.”143 The second
136

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 4–5.
140
Id. at 5. It is ironic that a case standing for the presumption of validity and the
deference due the USPTO, at its heart, is based on a reversal of the USPTO’s decision on
the issue of priority by a court. See id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 5–6 (citing Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120 (1894)). Notably, this basis for
the Supreme Court’s conclusion relies upon a concept similar to res judicata. Indeed, in
the earlier case upon which it relied, Morgan v. Daniels, the Court found that the
USPTO’s resolution of priority between two parties should be upheld in subsequent
litigation between the same two parties unless error can be shown by a burden similar to
clear and convincing evidence: “thorough conviction.” Id. at 125 (“[W]here the question
decided in the [USPTO] is one between contesting parties as to priority of invention, the
137

C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

3/15/2011 10:20 PM

CLEAR BUT UNCONVINCING

333

holds that findings of lower courts will be accepted by the
Supreme Court “unless clear error is shown.”144
In the fourth proceeding, the lawsuit filed by the assignee of De
Forest’s patents, Radio Corporation of America (“RCA”) alleged
infringement by Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (“REL”), a
third party unrelated to Armstrong.145 REL, however, aligned
itself with Armstrong, and Armstrong funded its defense.146
Significantly, the Court noted that the “evidence in this suit . . . is a
repetition, word for word, of the evidence in the earlier suits, so far
as material to the conflicting claims of Armstrong and De
Forest.”147 The district court held that REL did not succeed in
invalidating De Forest’s patents.148 The Second Circuit, however,
reversed and held—as the same court did eleven years before—
that Armstrong was the first inventor.149 The Supreme Court
granted review.150
With all of this history in mind, the Supreme Court proceeded
to address the question raised: whether to affirm the Second
Circuit’s invalidation of De Forest’s patents. After recognizing
that the judgments in the lawsuits between Armstrong and De
Forest and their respective assignees were not res judicata as to
REL, the Court explained that the standard for proving invalidity
of the De Forest patents was high:
A patent regularly issued, and even more obviously
a patent issued after a hearing of all the rival
claimants, is presumed to be valid until the

decision there made must be accepted as controlling upon that question of fact in any
subsequent suit between the same parties, unless the contrary is established by testimony
which in character and amount carries thorough conviction.”). Thus, the holding of
Morgan does not stand for the proposition that a broad presumption of validity attaches to
every patent, requiring clear and convincing evidence to invalidate the patent in every
instance.
144
Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 6 (citing United States v. State Inv. Co., 264 U.S. 206, 211
(1924)).
145
Radio Corp., 293 U.S. at 6.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 6–7.
150
Id. at 7.
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presumption has been overcome by convincing
evidence of error. . . . [O]ne otherwise an infringer
who assails the validity of a patent fair upon its face
bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails unless
his evidence has more than a dubious
preponderance.151
Thus, the Court indicated that a patent “regularly issued,” and
even more so one issued “after a hearing of all of the rival
claimants,” is presumed to be valid until this presumption of
validity is overcome by “convincing evidence of error.”152
Moreover, the Court indicated that an alleged infringer challenging
the validity of a patent “fair upon its face” bears a “heavy” burden
of proof that is higher than a mere “preponderance.”153
The Court went on to focus on the appropriateness of this
standard in various circumstances:
If that is true where the assailant connects himself
in some way with the title of the true inventor, it is
so a fortiori where he is a stranger to the invention,
without claim of title of his own. If it is true where
the assailant launches his attack with evidence
different, at least in form, from any theretofore
produced in opposition to the patent, it is so a bit
more clearly where the evidence is even verbally
the same.154
The first sentence indicates that this standard applies regardless
of whether the alleged infringer claims to be a prior inventor. The
second sentence indicates that this standard applies regardless of
whether the alleged infringer uses evidence “different in form” or
exactly the same as evidence previously used against the patent at
issue.
In the end, the Court determined that it would not contradict its
previous holding as to priority between De Forest and

151
152
153
154

Id. at 7–8.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id.
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Armstrong.155 In the prior appeal raising the priority dispute, it
had determined that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the
presumption of validity “in any clear or certain way,” and in this
case its reexamination of the record failed to convince it that its
prior determination was wrong.156
Several points concerning Radio Corp. are important to
consider. The first and most significant point is that, as shown by
the detailed summary of the case presented above, the facts
addressed by the Court concerned a matter litigated repeatedly in
various courts, between the rival claimants, and using the same
evidence. Any of the statements in Radio Corp. must be
understood in this context. The Court was not addressing a case
involving new evidence of invalidity, let alone better evidence of
invalidity.
Second, in the end, even the Court’s statements concerning
application of the clear and convincing burden of proof focused on
patents “regularly issued,” patents “fair upon [their] face,” and
patents “issued after a hearing of all the rival claimants.” Only in
these circumstances did the Court conclude that there is a
presumption of validity that requires clear and convincing evidence
to overcome.157 Thus, the Court left open the door to a lesser
burden of proof in certain circumstances.
In particular, the qualifications “regularly issued” and “after a
hearing of all of the rival claimants” indicate that a patent is not
“presumed to be valid until the presumption has been overcome by
convincing evidence of error” if (a) the patent is not regularly
issued or (b) the USPTO did not consider all of the rival claimants.
Moreover, the reference to “convincing evidence of error”
indicates that the actions of the USPTO should be reviewed for
error, not necessarily that the invalidity of the patent should be
reviewed under a clear and convincing burden of proof. Similarly,
the qualification “fair upon its face” indicates that an alleged
infringer challenging the validity of a patent does not bear a heavy
155

Id. at 10.
Id.
157
See also Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 373–74 (1928)
(noting that the submission to the USPTO of false evidence material to the issuance of
the patent may overcome or at least affect the application of the presumption of validity).
156
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burden of proof that is higher than a “mere preponderance” if the
patent is not fair upon its face. Moreover, while “regularly issued”
and “fair upon its face” are phrases subject to interpretation, one
reasonable interpretation of these phrases is that the patent
applicant disclosed the most relevant prior art to the USPTO for its
consideration before issuing the patent. In the absence of this
disclosure, one might reasonably conclude that the patent did not
“regularly issue” or was not “fair upon its face.”
Third, it is important to understand the precedent relied upon in
Radio Corp. That precedent related to instances in which an
alleged infringer relied upon mere testimony of witnesses to prove
prior invention.158 The holdings of those cases focus on the
question of corroboration of an alleged prior invention and, in
particular, corroboration of an alleged reduction to practice.159 In
the absence of corroboration of prior invention, the Court
effectively held in those cases, doubt existed that should be
resolved against the alleged prior inventor.160 To the extent that an
158
See Washburn & Moen Mfg. v. Beat ‘Em All Barbed-Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275, 285
(1892); Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 696 (1886); Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 120, 123–24 (1873).
159
Washburn, 143 U.S. at 285 (holding that “the frequency with which testimony is
tortured, or fabricated outright, to build up the defense of a prior use of the thing
patented” justifies placing the burden of proving prior use on the alleged infringer and
resolving every reasonable doubt against him); Cantrell, 117 U.S. at 696 (noting that
every reasonable doubt should be resolved against a party asserting prior invention when
the proof depended upon the testimony of two witnesses who did not produce a working
device or model of a working device but instead merely presented drawings made six
years after one of the witnesses claimed to have sold the device to the second witness);
Coffin, 85 U.S. at 123–24 (holding that every reasonable doubt should be resolved against
an alleged infringer attempting to prove prior invention based on the testimony of four
witnesses and that the focus of the analysis of the alleged infringer’s proof should be on
whether the alleged prior use was “embryonic or inchoate; if it rested in speculation or
experiment; if the process pursued for its development had failed to reach the point of
consummation”); see also Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing
Washburn for the proposition that “without some type of corroborating evidence, an
alleged inventor’s testimony cannot satisfy the ‘clear and convincing evidence’
standard”); Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., 513 F.2d 932, 936 (6th Cir. 1975)
(explaining that while “the source of the ‘clear and convincing’ standard springs from
these early decisions . . . [they] seem to have confined this strict standard to those cases
where a prior use was undertaken to be proved by oral testimony” and noting “[a]n
apparent expansion of this rationale” in Radio Corp.).
160
In response to the proposal by the Federal Trade Commission that the preponderance
burden of proof apply in litigation to the issue of invalidity in all instances, FED. TRADE
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alleged infringer attempts to rely on oral testimony alone, the same
result—a finding of no invalidity—can be achieved if the law
makes clear that uncorroborated testimony regarding invalidity
cannot as a matter of law rise to the level of a preponderance of the
evidence.
Fourth, the Supreme Court’s holding in Radio Corp. fails to
address or resolve the issue of whether the burden of proving
invalidity should be a preponderance of the evidence when more
relevant prior art is asserted in litigation than the prior art
considered by the USPTO.
iii. Supreme Court Opinions After Radio Corp. v. Radio
Engineering Laboratories, Inc.
The Supreme Court has issued a number of opinions after
Radio Corp. that highlight how the Court and its members
understand the presumption of validity and Radio Corp. itself.
These opinions indicate that disagreement and unresolved
questions remain over the meaning and effect of the presumption
of validity and the holding in Radio Corp. itself.
In Williams Manufacturing Co. v. United Shoe Machinery
Co.,161 for example, the Court affirmed a judgment that a patent
was infringed and not invalid without addressing the presumption
of validity or Radio Corp. Justice Black, however, dissented, with
Justices Douglas and Murphy concurring in the dissent. The
dissent expressed disagreement with the lower courts’ application
of Radio Corp.162 In particular, Justice Black disagreed with their

COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY, ch. 5, at 26–28 (2003), the American Intellectual Property Law
Association (“AIPLA”) focused its response on Radio Corp. and Supreme Court case law
addressing the need for corroboration of oral testimony of prior uses and prior invention,
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, AIPLA RESPONSE TO THE OCTOBER 2003 FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION REPORT—“TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY,” 6–16 (2004). Notably, the AIPLA ignored
the precedent of every circuit court other than the Federal Circuit. But even the AIPLA
concluded that once the existence, authentication, availability, and scope of evidence is
established by clear and convincing evidence, “the burden should be that the persuasive
force of such facts demonstrates patent invalidity by a fair preponderance, not some
elevated standard.” Id. at 16.
161
316 U.S. 364 (1942).
162
Id. at 392 (Black, J., dissenting).
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determination that the patent-in-suit was “a patent fair upon its
face” and that the evidence of non-patentability amounted to “no
more than a ‘dubious preponderance.’”163 Importantly, Justice
Black found no reason for extending the presumption of validity
arising from the mere issuance of a patent “beyond the narrow
compass” indicated by Radio Corp. absent a statutory prescription
to the contrary.164 Rather, he found several reasons for not
extending the presumption any further: (1) a patent is a grant of an
exclusive privilege yet it is normally issued in a non-adversary
proceeding; (2) at the time the USPTO kept patent applications on
file in secrecy until the time of issuance; (3) the public is
represented only insofar as the enormous volume of business
permits the examining staff of the USPTO to watch out for the
public interest; (4) patent examiners, unlike courts, do not have the
benefit of the results of investigations into the state of the prior art
by adversaries; and (5) even where the USPTO conducts
interference proceedings, the parties are not permitted to prove that
a third party was the first inventor.165
Significantly, Justice Black expressed the view that the
presumption arising from the issuance of a patent should be given
“small weight.”166 Moreover, he explained that, at very best, the
presumption might be permitted to tip the scale when other
considerations leave the issue of patentability in equilibrium.167 In
this way, Justice Black highlighted that, in his view, the
presumption of validity only places a preponderance burden of
proof on an alleged infringer.
163
Id. Presumably Justice Black concluded that the “prerequisites for establishing a
presumption of validity are not here present” because the patent-in-suit was not “fair
upon its face,” and not because the evidence of invalidity exceeded a preponderance of
the evidence. Otherwise, Justice Black was putting the cart (whether the evidence of
invalidity rises to the required level) before the horse (whether the presumption of
validity applies). This assumes, however, that the presumption of validity dictates the
level of proof required to invalidate a patent. If the presumption of validity is
synonymous with the ultimate question of validity, Justice Black may have concluded
that the fact that the evidence of invalidity exceeded a preponderance of the evidence
meant that the presumption of validity did not apply.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 392–93.
166
Id. at 393.
167
Id.
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Even after Congress codified the presumption of validity in
1952 after Williams Manufacturing Co.,168 some Supreme Court
justices continued to voice their concern with the application of the
presumption of validity by the lower courts. In Shultz v. Moore,169
for example, Justice Douglas—still on the bench thirty-two years
after he joined Justice Black’s dissent in Williams Manufacturing
Co.—dissented from the denial of a petition for writ of
certiorari.170 Justice Douglas in part faulted the Tenth Circuit for
holding that patents carry a presumption of validity that can be
overcome “only be clear and convincing evidence.”171 He
explained that courts cannot rely on the USPTO always to issue
valid patents, because (1) patent prosecution proceedings are nonadversarial; (2) applicants are persistent; (3) applicants may appeal
adverse administrative decisions but no corresponding check is
available to overturn erroneous findings of patentability; (4) as a
practical matter errors on the side of patentability “slip through
[the] process”; and (5) litigation of patent validity presents the only
opportunity for “judicial correction of the errors of generosity.”172
Thus, in both Williams Manufacturing Co. and Shultz, Supreme
Court justices indicated their disagreement with broad
interpretations or applications of Radio Corp. to require clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of validity.
Later, in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International,
Inc.,173 the Court itself—no longer just dissenting justices—noted
that the strength of the presumption of validity varies depending on
the particular circumstances.174 In particular, the Court held that
the presumption of validity “lack[ed] some of its earlier strength”
when the Federal Circuit vacated a judgment of invalidity based

168

Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in various sections
of Title 35 of the United States Code).
169
419 U.S. 930 (1974).
170
Id. at 930–32 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
171
Id. at 930.
172
Id. at 932.
173
508 U.S. 83 (1993).
174
See id. at 94 n.15.
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upon its affirmance of a judgment of noninfringement of the same
patent.175
The most recent Supreme Court case addressing the
presumption of validity is KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.176
There, the Court did not reach the question of whether the failure
to disclose a prior art reference during prosecution voids the
presumption of validity given to issued patents.177 It did, however,
note that “the rationale underlying the presumption—that the
[USPTO], in its expertise, has approved the claim—seems much
diminished” in this situation.178
Viewed as a whole, the opinions that have issued since Radio
Corp. reveal that the Supreme Court and its members may interpret
the presumption of validity and Radio Corp. differently than has
the Federal Circuit. In particular, the Court might hold that the
presumption of validity only requires invalidity to be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence in at least some circumstances, that
the presumption of validity does not require clear and convincing
evidence of invalidity, or that the strength of the presumption of
validity varies depending on the circumstances.
iv. Social Disutility Analysis
While all of the Supreme Court precedent discussed above
addresses the presumption of validity, there is other Supreme Court
precedent relevant to the question of the appropriate invalidity
standard. In particular, as the Federal Circuit has recognized,179
the Supreme Court has repeatedly utilized the “social disutility”
analysis to determine appropriate burdens of proof.180

175

Id. (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, all patents are presumed valid. Although that
presumption is obviously resurrected after the Federal Circuit vacates a finding of
invalidity, Morton’s current situation makes clear that the revived presumption lacks
some of its earlier strength.”).
176
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
177
Id. at 426.
178
Id.
179
See Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1193–94 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
180
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754–55 (1982); California v. Mitchell Bros.’
Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1981); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427
(1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The social disutility analysis can be used to determine the
appropriate burden of proof to apply to an issue in litigation. It
requires an assessment of the social disutility of erroneous findings
on that issue.181 In the context of invalidity of patents, for
example, the social disutility of an erroneous finding that a patent
is invalid must be compared with the social disutility of an
erroneous finding that a patent is not invalid. This comparison
explains the appropriate burden of proof, which in the civil context
will be either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence.182 A preponderance of the evidence burden
of proof indicates that the social disutility of an erroneous finding
that a truly valid patent is invalid is comparable to the social
disutility of an erroneous finding that a truly invalid patent is not
invalid.183 A clear and convincing evidence burden of proof
indicates that the social disutility of an erroneous finding that a
truly valid patent is invalid is much greater than the social
disutility of an erroneous finding that a truly invalid patent is not
invalid.184
In the invalidity context, as discussed above, the USPTO
applies the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof to the
issue of invalidity in the first instance.185 Viewed in light of the
social disutility analysis, the application of the preponderance of
the evidence burden of proof reflects a comparable level of social
disutility when a truly valid patent is found invalid and when a
truly invalid patent is found not invalid. On the one hand, a patent
is designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the “Progress
of Science and useful Arts.”186 On the other hand, a patent is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market, with “far-reaching social and
The social disutility analysis
economic consequences.”187
181

In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370.
Id.
183
See generally id.
184
See generally id.
185
See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
186
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
187
Id. In Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co., the Supreme Court explained that
both of these factors favor ensuring that patents issue free from fraud. Id. These same
182
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indicates that the application of the preponderance burden of proof
to the issue of invalidity reflects an equilibrium behind failing to
promote the progress of science and useful arts when its promotion
is appropriate and failing to prevent the unnecessary exception to
the general rule against monopolies and exclusive access to open
markets.
While the social disutility analysis focuses on the social
disutility resulting from incorrect findings on issues, the analysis
should also consider the likelihood that a jury or court might come
to an incorrect conclusion on an issue given any particular burden
of proof. In other words, the analysis should weigh the disutility of
incorrect conclusions only after considering the likelihood that
either disutility will, in fact, occur. Normally—when no unbiased,
expert third party has exercised its judgment on an issue—it is not
possible to consider this likelihood factor. But when an examiner
at the USPTO has considered prior art and exercised his or her
judgment on the issue, based on his or her presumed experience
and expertise, it is reasonable to conclude that the USPTO has
come to the correct conclusion.
Applying this likelihood factor to the social disutility analysis
in the context of invalidity, a finding of invalidity by a jury or
court under a preponderance burden of proof is presumptively
incorrect when it is based on evidence considered by the USPTO
because it is at odds with the USPTO’s conclusion. Thus, the
disutility associated with finding truly valid patents invalid is
likely to occur more often when compared to the disutility
associated with finding a truly invalid patent not invalid. Factoring
in the likelihood of the disutility, then, favors applying a clear and
convincing burden of proof in this situation. Thus, the clear and
convincing burden of proof should be used to require the jury or
court to supplant the expert USPTO’s judgment only when the jury
is convinced that the USPTO made a mistake. In other words, the
clear and convincing burden of proof should apply when the jury
or court is considering an issue already ruled upon by the USPTO.

factors, however, neatly capture the interests at stake in issuing valid patents and not
issuing invalid patents.
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But when the USPTO has not considered the patentability of
claims in light of the most relevant prior art, there is no deference
involved. That is, there is no basis to conclude that the jury or
court is less likely to make a mistake on the ultimate issue of
validity, and so a preponderance burden of proof should apply in
this circumstance, consistent with the burden of proof applied by
the USPTO itself when it considers an issue in the first instance.
To summarize, when factoring in the likelihood that a jury or
court might come to an incorrect conclusion given any particular
burden of proof, the social disutility analysis supports applying a
clear and convincing burden of proof on the issue of invalidity
when the USPTO considered the most relevant prior art. But in the
absence of any ability to judge the likelihood that a jury or court
might come to an incorrect conclusion, i.e., when the USPTO did
not consider the most relevant prior art and that prior art is
presented to the jury or court, the social disutility analysis supports
applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.188
b) The Law of Every Regional Circuit Prior to Creation of
the Federal Circuit
After Radio Corp. and the codification of the presumption of
validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 but prior to the formation of the Federal
Circuit, the circuit courts had interpreted and applied Radio Corp.
and 35 U.S.C. § 282. Significantly, their interpretations and
applications conflict with those of the Federal Circuit.189 Every

188
Adoption of a burden of proof on the issue of invalidity that depends upon
consideration of prior art by the USPTO also would comport with application of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to the question of the appropriate level of
deference to be given to findings of validity by the USPTO. See Stuart Minor Benjamin
& Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 293, 299 (2007) (concluding that 35 U.S.C. § 282
does not displace the APA, that no deference is owed to USPTO factfinding not done in
light of the introduction of new prior art, and that the legal conclusion of validity is
subject to the sliding scale of Skidmore deference). Indeed, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Supreme Court recognized that the weight given to an
administrative judgment will depend upon, inter alia, “the thoroughness evident in its
consideration.” Id. at 140.
189
Others have recognized the conflicting treatment of the presumption of validity by
the Federal Circuit and the other circuit courts. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent
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other circuit court of appeals has concluded that the presumption of
validity is at least weakened in some situations, such as when
“relevant,” “significant,” “pertinent,” “more pertinent,” or the
“most pertinent” prior art was not considered by the USPTO. In
this way, the courts have effectively concluded that the statutory
presumption of validity only requires a presumption that the
USPTO correctly ruled upon the evidence in front of it—not that
the USPTO considered the most relevant prior art or that it,
illogically, correctly ruled upon evidence that it did not even
consider. Furthermore, many of the other courts have adopted a
cumulativeness test, requiring the uncited prior art to be noncumulative as compared to the cited prior art before finding the
presumption of validity overcome. And some of the other circuit
courts have concluded that alleged infringers may prove invalidity
by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and
convincing evidence, in at least some situations.190
The law of each circuit court of appeals will be analyzed in
detail below.
i. The First Circuit
The First Circuit has held that prior art not considered by the
USPTO—especially in combination with evidence of omissions or
inaccuracies in prior art presented—as well as “highly pertinent”
but uncited prior art “eviscerates,” “overcomes,” or “weakens” the

Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 18–19 (2004).
190
While at least one professor has indicated that the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to
“squarely” adopt a burden of proof less than clear and convincing evidence in any
situation, see Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious
Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 928 (2004), a careful review of the case
law indicates that many circuits applied a burden less than clear and convincing evidence
when the most relevant prior art was not considered by the USPTO, as shown below.
The analysis below is supported by more contemporary analysis. See also Gerald Sobel,
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at Its Impact on
Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1092–93 (1988) (indicating that the
Second and Eighth Circuits required alleged infringers to overcome the presumption of
validity only by a “preponderance of the evidence, or by substantial evidence” and that
various other circuits qualified application of a clear and convincing burden by
acknowledging that alleged infringers “could weaken the presumption of validity by
demonstrating that the patent examiner did not review all of the relevant prior art
references during prosecution of the application for patent”).

C02_TAYLOR_20110315 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CLEAR BUT UNCONVINCING

3/15/2011 10:20 PM

345

presumption of validity.191 In one case, the court held that the
presumption of validity is strengthened where a district court holds
that the claims are not invalid.192 And in another case, the court
applied a burden of proof less than clear and convincing evidence
because the USPTO was not directed to instances of relevant prior
art.193
ii. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is
“weakened,” “undercut,” “severely undercut,” “substantially
weakened,” or that there is “no strong presumption” at all when the
USPTO has not considered prior art, “relevant prior art,”
“significant prior art,” “important prior art,” or “much of the prior
art.”194 According to the Second Circuit, the fact that prior art
relied upon in litigation was not before the examiner “detracts”
from the presumption of validity.195
Conversely, the Second Circuit has held that the presumption
of validity is “strengthened,” “heightened,” or “entitled to
particular weight” by the USPTO’s consideration, “adequate
consideration,” or “careful consideration” of a prior art

191

See, e.g., Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 717 F.2d 622, 628 (1st Cir. 1983);
Shanklin Corp. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 521 F.2d 609, 616–18 (1st Cir. 1975);
Boyajian v. Old Colony Envelope Co., 279 F.2d 572, 575 n.4 (1st Cir. 1960); see also
Gross v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 F.2d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 1975) (noting that the USPTO did
not have before it the evidence of lack of utility, including the admission of the plaintiff,
and affirming the district court’s factual finding as not clearly erroneous); Marasco v.
Compo Shoe Mach. Corp., 325 F.2d 695, 697 (1st Cir. 1963) (holding that the
presumption of validity gathered from the fact that the examiner cited the prior art at
issue was “sufficiently overcome”).
192
Int’l Paper Box Mach. Co. v. Specialty Automatic Mach. Corp., 414 F.2d 1254,
1262 (1st Cir. 1969).
193
Futorian Mfg. Corp. v. Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc., 528 F.2d 941, 943–44 (1st Cir.
1976).
194
See Julie Research Labs., Inc. v. Guildline Instruments, Inc., 501 F.2d 1131, 1136
(2d Cir. 1974); Lemelson v. Topper Corp., 450 F.2d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1971); Reeves
Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Laminating Corp., 417 F.2d 869, 872 (2d Cir. 1969); Cont’l Can Co. v.
Old Dominion Box Co., 393 F.2d 321, 326 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968); Audio Devices, Inc. v.
Armour Research Found., 293 F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Triax Co. v.
Hartman Metal Fabricators, Inc., 479 F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir. 1973); see, e.g., Zoomar,
Inc. v. Paillard Prods., Inc., 258 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 1958).
195
See Formal Fashions, Inc. v. Braiman Bows, Inc., 369 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1966).
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reference.196 In one case, the court indicated that, while the
presumption of validity “may be slight in the light of the normal
procedures of the [USPTO],” it is heightened by a showing that the
prior art was “adequately considered.”197
The Second Circuit has noted, however, that the weight to be
attached to the determination of examiners “must be very limited,”
and is “totally unlike” the weight accorded the determination of an
administrative agency after an adversary proceeding.198 Likewise,
it has recognized that “nothing is more common” in a suit for
infringement than to find that “all the important references are
turned up for the first time by the industry of a defendant whose
interest animates his search,” and that “[i]t is a reasonable caution
not to tie the hands of a whole art until there is at least the added
assurance which comes from such an incentive.”199 Indeed, the
court has held that the presumption of validity serves to place the
burden of proof on the person who asserts invalidity and that, “in
the usual case,” a preponderance of the evidence determines the
issue.200
In one of its last opinions on the subject, the Second Circuit
recognized that the reason for the presumption of validity is that
the USPTO is staffed by expert and experienced personnel
uniquely qualified to determine patentability, but that its “heavy
workload” requires “searching review” by courts.201
iii.
196

The Third Circuit

See Rooted Hair, Inc. v. Ideal Toy Corp., 329 F.2d 761, 763 (2d Cir. 1964); see also
Shackelton v. J. Kaufman Iron Works, Inc., 689 F.2d 334, 339 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982);
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 132–33 (2d Cir. 1958).
197
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 372 F.2d 263, 268 (2d Cir.
1967); see also Rich Prods. Corp. v. Mitchell Foods, Inc., 357 F.2d 176, 181 (2d Cir.
1966) (explaining that the presumption is strengthened where the same questions raised
in litigation were raised in prosecuting the patent in the USPTO and there successfully
met).
198
Lorenz v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105–06 n.6 (2d Cir. 1962).
199
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir.
1971).
200
Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969).
201
Howes v. Great Lakes Press Corp., 679 F.2d 1023, 1028–29 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Kahn v. Dynamics Corp., 508 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1974) (indicating that the
presumption has been weakened in recent years by the fact that the USPTO is too
overworked to give adequate attention to patent applications).
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On the one hand, the Third Circuit has held that the
presumption of validity is “weakened” or “overcome” when a
party asserts “significant,” “pertinent,” or “relevant” prior art—or
“important portions” of a prior art reference—in litigation that was
not considered by the USPTO.202 On the other hand, the Third
Circuit has held that, where the USPTO considered prior art
invoked in litigation by an alleged infringer, the presumption of
validity is “further reinforced.”203 And it has specified that when
the USPTO allows a patent after interference proceedings the
presumption of validity is “strengthened.”204
In one particular opinion, the Third Circuit explained that
where pertinent prior art has been considered by the USPTO the
presumption of validity is “often strengthened,” that where
relevant prior art has not been considered by the USPTO the
presumption is “weakened or overcome,” and that where “relevant
prior art has not been considered “the degree by which the
presumption is weakened depends on a balancing of the pertinence
of the newly cited art against the pertinence of the art actually
considered by the [USPTO].”205 In that case, the court found that
non-cumulative prior art rendered an asserted patent invalid.206
iv. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is
“weakened,” “weakened or destroyed,” or “very much weakened”
202

See N. Eng’g & Plastics Corp. v. Eddy, 652 F.2d 333, 337–38 (3d Cir. 1981); Arrow
Safety Device Co. v. Nassau Fastening Co., 496 F.2d 644, 646 (3d Cir. 1974); LayneN.Y. Co. v. Allied Asphalt Co., 501 F.2d 405, 407 (3d Cir. 1974); U.S. Expansion Bolt
Co. v. Jordan Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1973); Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1272 n.33 (3d Cir. 1972); Philips Elec. & Pharm. Indus.
Corp. v. Thermal & Elecs. Indus., Inc., 450 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d Cir. 1971); Chem.
Constr. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 311 F.2d 367, 374 n.1 (3d Cir. 1962);
Dole Refrigerating Co. v. Amerio Contact Plate Freezers, Inc., 265 F.2d 627, 629 (3d Cir.
1959); see also Scripto, Inc. v. Ferber Corp., 267 F.2d 308, 308 (3d Cir. 1959) (indicating
that the fact that “a wealth of relevant prior art had not been called to the attention” of the
examiner “detracted materially from the importance of the presumption” of validity).
203
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Am. Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp.,
546 F.2d 530, 540 n.28 (3d Cir. 1976).
204
United Mattress Mach. Co. v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 207 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir.
1953).
205
Aluminum Co. v. Amerola Prods. Corp., 552 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (3d Cir. 1977).
206
Id. at 1025.
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when “relevant” or “pertinent” prior art was not considered by the
examiner, and that the presumption “can be given little weight”
when the examiner considered “none of the devices found in the
prior art.”207
The court has also held that the presumption of validity is
“strengthened” or “reinforced” where the “principal references”
were considered by the examiner, where the alleged infringer cites
the same prior art considered by the examiner, where alleged
infringers are unable to come up with any prior art “more
pertinent” than prior art considered by the examiner, or where
there were “extensive administrative proceedings” concerned with
the prior art.208 In one case, the Fourth Circuit distinguished
Supreme Court precedent requiring proof of invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence, including
Radio Corp., because in those cases the issue was priority of the
same invention between two inventors rather than invalidity “by
reason of relevant disclosures of prior art.”209 The court went on to
state that the presumption of validity is strengthened to some
extent by “the more than usual consideration given to the problem
of patentability in the [USPTO]” and weakened to some extent
because the USPTO did not consider some of the prior art asserted
in the litigation.210
v.
The Fifth Circuit
In 1970, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the opinions of the
various circuit courts “are in a morass of conflict” on the issue of

207
See Christopher J. Foster, Inc. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 531
F.2d 1243, 1245 (4th Cir. 1975); Blohm & Voss AG v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 489
F.2d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1973); Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of
S.C., 407 F.2d 557, 561 (4th Cir. 1969); Marston v. J.C. Penney Co., 353 F.2d 976, 982
(4th Cir. 1965); Heyl & Patterson, Inc. v. McDowell Co., 317 F.2d 719, 722 (4th Cir.
1963); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 244 F.2d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1957).
208
See Marston, 353 F.2d at 982; see also Power Curbers, Inc. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co.,
298 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1962); Manville Boiler Co. v. Columbia Boiler Co., 269 F.2d
600, 604 (4th Cir. 1959); Otto v. Koppers Co., 246 F.2d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 1957); Brown
v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1957); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Aghnides, 246 F.2d
718, 721 (4th Cir. 1957); Reynolds v. Whitin Mach. Works, 167 F.2d 78, 83 (4th Cir.
1948).
209
Universal Inc. v. Kay Mfg. Corp., 301 F.2d 140, 148 (4th Cir. 1962).
210
Id.
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the appropriate burden of proof on invalidity.211 This recognition,
however, related to the ultimate burden of proof—clear and
convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence, or proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, even after Radio Corp.—and not
whether the presumption of validity is weakened when more
pertinent prior art is advanced in litigation when compared to the
prior art considered by the USPTO.212
Indeed, like every other regional circuit at the time, the Fifth
Circuit’s precedent held that the presumption of validity
“vanishes” or is “measurably weakened,” “seriously weakened,”
“mitigated,” “weakened,” “greatly weakened,” “severely
weakened,” “weakened, if not destroyed,” or “greatly weakened if
not dispelled” if the USPTO did not consider “pertinent,” “a
particular,” “more similar,” “all,” “an important element of,” or
“highly pertinent” prior art—or simply when prior art was not
submitted to the USPTO.213
Two of the last few Fifth Circuit cases to address the
presumption of validity and its effect on the burden of proof on the
issue of invalidity, prior to exclusive jurisdiction over these cases
being lodged in the Federal Circuit, are noteworthy. In the first,
the Fifth Circuit indicated that, to rebut the presumption of
validity, a party seeking to invalidate a patent must show, not only
that the USPTO failed to consider pertinent prior art, but also that
the evidence is not cumulative.214 Yet the court in that case still
211

Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Escambia Chem. Corp., 430 F.2d 920, 924–25 (5th Cir. 1970).
Id.
213
See, e.g., Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1982);
Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng’g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1143 (5th Cir. 1982); Ebeling
v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 683 F.2d 909, 913 n.11 (5th Cir. 1982); Cont’l Oil Co. v. Cole, 634
F.2d 188, 195 (5th Cir. 1981); Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d
1057, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981); Arbrook, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 645 F.2d 273, 276
n.1 (5th Cir. 1981); Huron Mach. Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d 222,
224 (5th Cir. 1980); John Zink Co. v. Nat’l Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547, 551 (5th
Cir. 1980); Catholic Prot. Serv. v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 594 F.2d 499, 505 (5th Cir.
1979); Bird Provision Co. v. Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d 369, 377 (5th Cir.
1978); Steelcase, Inc. v. Delwood Furniture Co., 578 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1978); Parker
v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1975); Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div., Nat’l
Lead Co., 218 F.2d 72, 75 (5th Cir. 1955); Fritz W. Glitsch & Sons, Inc. v. Wyatt Metal
& Boiler Works, 224 F.2d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1955).
214
May v. Am. S.W. Waterbed Distribs., Inc., 715 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1983).
212
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required that the proof of invalidity—even in light of a noncumulative reference—“be more than a preponderance of the
evidence.”215 In the second case, however, the Fifth Circuit,
breaking with its own precedent,216 held that the introduction of
evidence that the USPTO failed to consider relevant prior art
reduces the burden of proof from clear and convincing evidence to
a preponderance of the evidence.217 Thus, while there are cases in
the Fifth Circuit holding that the failure of the USPTO to consider
prior art reduces the burden to prove invalidity from clear and
convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence, the Fifth
Circuit has issued opinions directly contradicting one another on
this issue.218
vi. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is
“greatly strengthened” where “the most pertinent prior art” has
been considered by the USPTO.219 The court also has held that the
presumption of validity is “largely if not wholly vitiated,” “greatly
weakened,” “greatly weakened and largely dissipated,” “seriously
weakened,” “weakened or destroyed,” or just “weakened” if “the

215

Id.
See, e.g., id.; Reed Tool Co., 672 F.2d at 526; Ludlow Corp., 636 F.2d at 1059.
217
A.B. Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1982).
218
Compare Gaddis v. Calgon Corp., 506 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[P]ertinent
prior art not considered by the [USPTO] weakens the presumption of validity which
normally attaches to a patent and requires a court to scrutinize the patent more closely.
Nevertheless, the presumption of validity is a strong one and is not to be overthrown
except by clear and cogent evidence, that is, ‘evidence (which) has more than a dubious
preponderance.’” (quoting Radio Corp. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934))) with
A.B. Baumstimler, 677 F.2d at 1066–68 (“Where the validity of a patent is challenged for
failure to consider prior art, the bases for the presumption of validity, the acknowledged
experience and expertise of the [USPTO] personnel and the recognition that patent
approval is a species of administrative determination supported by evidence, no longer
exist and thus the challenger of the validity of the patent need no longer bear the heavy
burden of establishing invalidity either ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ or ‘by clear and
convincing evidence.’ . . . Given the introduction of evidence that the [USPTO] failed to
consider relevant prior art . . . the standard of proof required . . . to overcome the
presumption of validity of the patents was not ‘clear and convincing’ but simply a
preponderance of the evidence.” (citation omitted)).
219
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 717 F.2d 269, 276 (6th Cir. 1983); Nat’l
Rolled Thread Die Co. v. E.W. Ferry Screw Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 593, 597 (6th Cir.
1976); Bolkcom v. Carborundum Co., 523 F.2d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 1975).
216
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most relevant,” “applicable,” “pertinent,” “highly relevant,” or
“most pertinent” prior art is not considered by the USPTO.220 In
one case the court indicated that “it is axiomatic” that the “limited
force” of the presumption of validity can be weakened or destroyed
where it is shown that the most relevant prior art was not disclosed
to the examiner.221
The Sixth Circuit, like the Third Circuit, has explained that the
degree by which the presumption is weakened when relevant prior
art was not considered by the USPTO depends upon a balancing of
the pertinence of the newly cited prior art and the pertinence of the
prior art considered by the patent examiner.222 In addition, the
Sixth Circuit—again like the Third Circuit—has applied a
cumulativeness test to prior art not considered by the USPTO,
noting that it must be prior art that would “ordinarily be expected
to influence the examiner with respect to the patentability of the
invention” but not prior art that is cumulative to cited prior art.223
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the presumption of
validity merely serves to allocate to the party claiming invalidity
the burden of proof and that that burden in the typical case is proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.224

220

Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167, 176 (6th Cir. 1985); Dollar
Elec. Co. v. Syndevco, Inc., 688 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1982); Universal Elec. Co. v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 643 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1981); Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Letica
Corp., 617 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1980); Eltra Corp. v. Basic Inc., 599 F.2d 745, 754
n.18 (6th Cir. 1979); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Acorn Bldg. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d
155, 160 (6th Cir. 1977); Nat. Rolled Thread Die Co., 541 F.2d at 597; Bolkcom, 523
F.2d at 498; Dunlop Co. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 1973).
221
Eltra Corp., 599 F.2d at 754 n.18; Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg. Co. v. Detroit
Gasket & Mfg. Co., 148 F.2d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 1945).
222
Am. Seating Co. v. Nat’l Seating Co., 586 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1978); Tee-Pak,
Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 491 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit has
also explained that, while the presumption of validity is weakened if applicable prior art
is not considered by the USPTO, it is not necessarily destroyed because the alleged
infringer “must do more to invalidate the presumption than merely showing the [prior art]
was not cited by the [USPTO].” Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d
265, 271 (6th Cir. 1964).
223
Schnading Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383, 390–91 (6th Cir. 1974).
224
See Saginaw Prods. Corp. v. E. Airlines, Inc., 615 F.2d 1136, 1140 (6th Cir. 1980)
(“The patent was presumed to be valid because it was regularly issued by the [USPTO].
Offering the patent in evidence, as the plaintiff did, established a prima facie case of
validity. . . . The burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish its affirmative
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vii. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is
“largely if not wholly” dissipated when “pertinent” prior art is not
considered by the USPTO, and that the degree by which it is
weakened depends on a balancing of the pertinence of the newly
cited prior art with the pertinence of the prior art considered by the
USPTO.225 In this regard, it has held that the presumption is
“destroyed” when the examiner did not consider “the most
pertinent” prior art.226 Interestingly, the issue of cumulativeness is
addressed in some Seventh Circuit cases, but using different
terminology. In those cases the issue is “equivalency”—whether
the prior art asserted in litigation is “equivalent” to prior art
considered by the examiner.227
While, as mentioned, some Seventh Circuit cases indicate that
balancing of the pertinence of prior art is required, other Seventh
Circuit cases have not balanced the pertinence of the prior art at all
and instead have found that the presumption does not exist simply
because prior art was not before the USPTO.228 The court has
gone so far as to say that “even one prior art reference” not

defenses by a preponderance of evidence.”); Eltra Corp. v. Basic Inc., 599 F.2d 745, 750
(6th Cir. 1979) (“The presumption has no independent evidentiary significance, however,
as it merely serves to allocate to the party claiming invalidity the burden of proving it. In
the typical case such as this, where the bulk of the evidence of the prior art is contained in
documents, the party claiming obviousness need only do so by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (citations omitted)).
225
National Bus. Sys., Inc. v. AM Int’l, Inc., 743 F.2d 1227, 1230, 1233 (7th Cir.
1984).
226
Moore v. Wesbar Corp., 701 F.2d 1247, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Shemitz v.
Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that where anticipating prior
art was not before the examiner there is no longer a presumption of validity). The
Seventh Circuit has even indicated that the presumption may be diminished by the
submission to the USPTO of a long list of prior art “without identifying the most relevant
prior art.” Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 663 F.2d 724, 731–32 (7th Cir. 1981).
227
Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 337 (7th Cir. 1983);
Deere & Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 658 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th Cir. 1981).
228
Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 646 F.2d 1201, 1208 (7th Cir. 1981); Hyster Co. v. Hunt
Foods, Inc., 263 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir. 1959); Hobbs v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 250
F.2d 100, 105 (7th Cir. 1957).
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considered by the USPTO can “overthrow” the presumption of
validity.229
A particularly important Seventh Circuit case is Chicago
Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. Crane Packing Co.230 In an
opinion by then-Judge Stevens that issued just three months prior
to his escalation to the Supreme Court, the court explained that the
presumption of validity includes two aspects.
First, the
presumption places a burden of persuasion on the alleged infringer
that remains upon the alleged infringer throughout the proceeding
and “is in no sense dependent on the character of the proceedings
before the [USPTO] or the amount of prior art cited to, or
considered by, the Patent Examiner.”231 Second, the presumption
requires the alleged infringer to make a “clear and cogent”
showing of invalidity in order to prevail when the prior art cited to
establish invalidity has already been considered by the USPTO.232
Then-Judge Stevens explained that this additional aspect to the
presumption relates to the deference due the technical expertise
possessed by the USPTO.233
Significantly, then-Judge Stevens went on to explain that
consideration of prior art by the USPTO justifies the clear and
convincing burden of proof but not some higher burden of proof.234
Conversely, he explained that the requirement that invalidity be
established by clear and convincing evidence “is largely, if not
wholly, dissipated when pertinent prior art is shown not to have
been considered by the [USPTO].”235 He explained why:
For then the Examiner’s expertise may have been
applied to an incomplete set of data and there can be
no certainty that he would have arrived at the same
conclusion in the face of the evidence and argument
presented to the court. Nor may we safely assume
229

Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 1980);
Henry Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Filters Corp., 489 F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 1972).
230
523 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1975).
231
Id. at 457–58.
232
Id. at 458.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
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that the Examiner has considered art which is not
cited. On the contrary, we have held that the failure
to cite pertinent prior art implies that it was
overlooked by the Examiner.236
In this way, then-Judge Stevens focused on whether the
examiner applied his or her expertise in any particular case and
highlighted that it is not safe to assume that an examiner considers
prior art that he or she does not cite. Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit presumes that uncited prior art was overlooked by the
examiner.237
In light of Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co., it is not
surprising that a later Seventh Circuit case expressly held that the
burden of proof is “less stringent” than clear and convincing when
“non-equivalent, uncited prior art” was not considered by the
USPTO,238 or that in another case the court held that the
presumption of validity “and its commensurate level of proof is
largely, if not wholly, dissipated when pertinent prior art is not
considered by the [USPTO].”239
viii. The Eighth Circuit
Like the other circuit courts, the Eighth Circuit has held that
“relevant,” “pertinent,” “the most relevant,” or “applicable” prior
art not considered by the USPTO, or several prior art references
not considered by the USPTO, “weakens,” “weakens if not
completely destroys,” “greatly weakens if not completely
destroys,” or “substantially weakens” the presumption of
validity.240 In one case, the court went so far as to say that an
alleged infringer does not bear the “heavy burden necessary to
236

Id.
Id.
238
Dickey-John Corp. v. Int’l Tapetronics Corp., 710 F.2d 329, 337 (7th Cir. 1983).
239
Med. Lab. Automation, Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1981).
240
See Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546,
548 (8th Cir. 1982); Bolt, Beranek & Newman, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 521
F.2d 338, 340 (8th Cir. 1975); Ralston Purina Co. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 442 F.2d 389,
390 (8th Cir. 1971); Am. Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977,
989 (8th Cir. 1966); Imperial Stone Cutters, Inc. v. Schwartz, 370 F.2d 425, 429 (8th Cir.
1966); Piel Mfg. Co. v. George A. Rolfes Co., 363 F.2d 57, 60 n.4 (8th Cir. 1966); John
Deere Co. v. Graham, 333 F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1964); L.S. Donaldson Co. v. La Maur,
Inc., 299 F.2d 412, 420 (8th Cir. 1962).
237
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overcome a presumption at its full strength” when the USPTO has
not considered the most relevant of all prior art.241 And it has also
held that “the presumption of validity is entitled to great weight
where it appears that the [USPTO] gave careful consideration to
the applicable prior art.”242
One case in particular deserves thorough discussion. In E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co.,243 the Eighth Circuit
issued an opinion authored by Chief Judge Markey, who sat by
designation from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.244 In
this case, the court indicated that the presumption of validity is not
limited to references actually cited by the examiner.245 Citing
Solder Removal Co. and additional precedent from other circuits,
Chief Judge Markey noted that the burden of persuasion remains
upon the party asserting invalidity whether relevant prior art was or
was not considered by the USPTO.246 Significantly, the court held
that the presumption of validity requires courts to find that the
examiner’s prior art search is “prima facie evidence that the
examiner considered all of the references classified in the classes
and subclasses searched” and that the examiner left uncited those
references he or she regarded as less relevant than those cited.247
Moreover, the court, without citing any authority, expressed its
view that by enacting the presumption of validity Congress chose
to assume that an oversight of relevant prior art did not occur.248
Otherwise, the court explained, in view of the large number of
patents in a single class or subclass, the requirement to cite every
patent inspected would “unreasonably retard the examination
process.”249 “Thus,” the court concluded, “absent contrary
evidence, it is improper to conclude that references not specifically
cited by the examiner, but classified in areas he searched, were not
241

Am. Infra-Red Radiant Co., 360 F.2d at 989.
L.S. Donaldson Co., 299 F.2d at 420.
243
620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1980).
244
Id. at 1254.
245
Id. at 1266.
246
Id. at 1266 n.30 (citing Solder Removal Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 582 F.2d
628 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
247
Id. at 1267.
248
Id.
249
Id.
242
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considered by him.”250 In this regard, Chief Judge Markey directly
contradicted then-Judge Stevens’ opinion in Chicago Rawhide
Mfg. Co.251
Chief Judge Markey concluded that the trial court’s instruction
that the presumption of validity “does not extend or exist as to
prior art patents or publications which do not appear from the
record of the file wrapper” and its refusal to give an instruction that
it is “assumed that the examiner reviewed the prior art which was
in the files which he searched” left the jury “unapprised of the full
extent of the statutory presumption of validity.”252
ix. The Ninth Circuit
In one of the last Ninth Circuit cases to address the
presumption of validity, the court held that a patent simply “was
not presumed to be valid” when prior art was not considered by the
USPTO.253 Indeed, in some cases the court held that the burden of
proof on invalidity shifts to the patentee if the examiner did not
review prior art later asserted in litigation or if the uncited prior art
contains disclosure closer to the patented device than the
disclosures of the prior art considered by the examiner.254 And
some cases emphasized that “even one” unconsidered prior art
reference may “overthrow the presumption of validity.”255
Other cases, however, did not go quite that far. For example,
the Ninth Circuit also held that the presumption of validity “will
disappear” only if the applicant failed to disclose “relevant” prior
art to the USPTO.256 Other cases indicate that the presumption is
“dissipated” when the examiner fails to consider “pertinent” prior
art or that uncited prior art discloses “something not disclosed” by

250

Id.
See Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Crane Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452, 458 (7th Cir.
1975).
252
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 620 F.2d at 1266–67.
253
Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc., 706 F.2d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1983).
254
Penn Int’l Indus., Inc. v. New World Mfg., Inc., 691 F.2d 1297, 1300–02 (9th Cir.
1982); Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980).
255
Jaybee Mfg. Corp. v. Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp., 287 F.2d 228, 229 (9th Cir. 1961).
256
Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982).
251
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cited prior art.257 Furthermore, numerous cases in the Ninth
Circuit applied a cumulativeness test to unconsidered prior art.258
x.
The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has held that the presumption of validity is
“considerably weakened if the patent examiner did not consider
relevant prior art.”259 Indeed, it has held that the “strong
presumption of validity” attributable to a “properly issued patent”
is greatly diminished when the USPTO fails to consider relevant
prior art.260 The court also has held that the presumption is
strengthened when the trial court examined the “pertinent” prior art
and concluded that the patent was not invalid.261
Two of the Tenth Circuit opinions deserve special attention. In
the first case, Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of
Oklahoma, Inc.,262 the court held that the USPTO’s “decision to
issue a patent is entitled to deference only to the extent that it is
based on relevant facts and on correct principles of law.”263 The
court noted that if the USPTO failed to consider relevant prior art
then “the basis for according deference vanishes.”264 It concluded
that when unconsidered prior art reveals a substantial basis for
challenging the USPTO’s decision to issue the patent, the district
court must make a fresh assessment of validity, and that such a
basis exists (1) if the USPTO overlooked prior art that is more
pertinent than the art that it did consider or (2) if the USPTO
overlooked prior art that is less pertinent than the art that it did
257

Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 664 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1982); NDM
Corp. v. Hayes Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981).
258
Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 694 F.2d 570, 575 (9th
Cir. 1982); Carson Mfg. Co. v. Carsonite Int’l Corp., 686 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1981);
Hammerquist v. Clarke’s Sheet Metal, Inc., 658 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1981);
Houston v. Polymer Corp., 637 F.2d 617, 619–20 (9th Cir. 1980).
259
Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 668 F.2d 462, 469 (10th Cir. 1982).
260
Norfin, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 625 F.2d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1980); see also
M.B. Skinner Co. v. Cont’l Indus., Inc., 346 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1965) (indicating
that the presumption of validity is rebuttable “particularly where” much of the prior art
relied upon in litigation was not considered by the USPTO, but that commercial success
may be considered as properly strengthening the presumption of validity).
261
Lam, Inc., 668 F.2d at 469.
262
708 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1983).
263
Id. at 1558.
264
Id.
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consider but that nevertheless substantially undermines its
decision.265 Finally, the court also indicated that the “crucial
inquiry” is not the relative pertinence of the unconsidered prior art
but instead is whether the unconsidered art leads the court to
reasonably question the USPTO’s decision.266 If this threshold
level of doubt is reached, the Tenth Circuit explained, then the
court must reassess the patent and conduct an independent
examination of all pertinent prior art.267
In the second case, Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck
Kustom Boats and Products, Inc.,268 the court explained that the
rationale for a strong presumption of validity is the expertise of the
USPTO in determining when the conditions for patentability have
been satisfied.269 Therefore, the court reasoned, when the USPTO
has failed to take into account relevant prior art, “it cannot be said
that that agency has fully brought its expertise to bear on the task
at hand and the statutory presumption [of validity] is diminished or
dissipated altogether.”270 Overcoming the presumption, however,
does not, without more, invalidate the patent.271 Instead, the court
explained, “once any highly relevant but unconsidered prior art is
introduced, a fresh assessment of all the art new and old must be
carried out without benefit to the patentee of the presumption.”272
Also at issue in Sidewinder was the effect of a prior adjudication
concerning the validity of the patent-in-suit. The court noted the
“high presumption of validity”273 ordinarily afforded to a prior
adjudication favorable to the patentee, but held that “where
relevant prior art was not before the court rendering the earlier
adjudication of validity, that decision has little precedential
value.”274

265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274

Id.
Id.
Id.
597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 205.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206 n.6.
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 207.
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xi. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit was formed in 1981, just one year prior to
the formation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.275 In one of the
Eleventh Circuit’s only cases addressing the presumption of
validity—if not the only one—the court adopted the view that
when pertinent, non-cumulative prior art was not considered by the
USPTO, the burden upon the challenging party is lessened to a
preponderance of the evidence.276
The Court addressed nuanced issues with respect to the
application of this standard. In particular, the court addressed the
issue of what degree of relevance uncited prior art must have
before the burden is reduced to a preponderance of the evidence,
and how to determine if the USPTO considered prior art.277 The
patentee contended that the uncited prior art must be more
pertinent than the prior art considered by the USPTO, and that the
uncited prior art must be outside the patent classification areas of
the prior art considered by the USPTO.278 The court rejected both
of these positions.
First, the court held that the presumption of validity is seriously
eroded (and the preponderance burden of proof applies) if the
patent challenger brings forward any relevant, uncited prior art.279
The court cited the lack of any contrary authority, the duty of
candor of patent applicants, and the anticompetitive effects of a
patent as justification for such a strict rule.280 Significantly,
however, the court noted that cumulative prior art references will
not weaken the presumption of validity.281

275

See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994.
276
Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1360–61, 1363–64 (11th
Cir. 1982). The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had gone even further than reducing
the burden on the party challenging validity, instead holding that the failure to cite
relevant prior art to the USPTO completely overturns the presumption of validity and
shifts the burden of proof to the patent holder to demonstrate validity. Id. at 1361 (citing
Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980)).
277
Id. at 1363–64.
278
Id. at 1363.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id. at 1364.
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Second, the court rejected the contention that a reference to a
patent classification area compels the inference that the patent
examiner considered and rejected all prior art in that
classification.282 The court explained the impropriety of this
inference, pointing to the large number of patents within each
patent classification area and the testimony of the patentee’s own
expert witness that patent examiners will sometimes miss highly
pertinent prior art when searching.283
xii. The District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit has held that the presumption
of validity does not apply to prior art not cited by the USPTO and,
like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, that even one uncited prior art
reference overcomes the presumption.284 Similarly, the court has
ruled that the presumption is weakened when an issue was either
not the subject of a USPTO finding or an assumption underlying
its finding is “demonstrably inaccurate in a material degree.”285
And again, the court has held that the presumption of validity is
“weakened” where the examiner did not consider closely prior art
invoked in litigation.286
By contrast, the court has found that a strong presumption of
validity results from the fact that the USPTO is “an expert body
pre-eminently qualified to determine” validity, that this
presumption is reinforced where a district court sustains the
USPTO, and that the appellate review is limited to searching for
the lack of a “rational basis” for the conclusion on the issue of
invalidity or the presence of a “thorough conviction” of error on
this issue.287 Moreover, the court has held that unless new
evidence brings “thorough conviction” that the USPTO was
wrong, the court should accord to the USPTO a presumption of
validity.288
282

Id.
Id.
284
Turzillo v. P. & Z. Mergentime, 532 F.2d 1393, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
285
Corning Glass Works v. Brenner, 470 F.2d 410, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
286
Filmon Process Corp. v. Spell-Right Corp., 404 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
287
Pro-Col Corp. v. Comm’r of Patents, 436 F.2d 296, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
288
Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp. v. Brenner, 389 F.2d 927, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Hays v. Brenner, 357 F.2d 287, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Railex Corp. v. Joseph
283
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C. The Benefits
There are many benefits to reducing the burden of proof on the
issue of invalidity for unconsidered, material prior art from clear
and convincing evidence to a preponderance of the evidence.
Patent applicants would have an incentive to search for and
disclose the most relevant prior art to the USPTO; patent quality
would increase; patents would more often serve their constitutional
purpose of rewarding inventors for disclosing their discoveries;
and transaction costs associated with the licensing and litigation of
ultimately invalid patents would be reduced. These benefits reflect
the policy-based support for a preponderance burden of proof for
unconsidered, material prior art.
1. Creating an Incentive to Search for and Disclose Relevant
Prior Art
Reduction of the burden of proof from clear and convincing
evidence to a preponderance of the evidence for unconsidered,
material prior art would create an incentive for patent applicants to
search for and disclose relevant prior art to the USPTO. As a
reward for presenting prior art to the USPTO, the patent applicant
would obtain (1) a higher burden of proof on the issue of invalidity
if an alleged infringer later asserted the same prior art in litigation
and (2) a higher burden of proof on the issue of invalidity if an
alleged infringer latter asserted equally material or less material
prior art in litigation. Thus, to the extent a patent applicant could
find and present to the USPTO prior art that is just as material as or
more material than any other unknown prior art, the examiner’s
consideration of the disclosed prior art would create an absolute
clear and convincing burden of proof in litigation. As discussed
above, this behavior would fortify the presumption of validity upon
which the clear and convincing burden of proof is based.289

Guss & Sons, Inc., 382 F.2d 179, 182 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that it is “clear beyond
doubt” that while a patent is presumed valid that presumption is rebuttable particularly
where the prior art was not available or considered by the USPTO); Reynolds v.
Aghnides, 356 F.2d 367, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that doubt should be resolved in
favor of the correctness of administrative action and reversing a district court order
requiring the USPTO to issue a patent).
289
See supra Part II.C.
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2. Increased Patent Quality, Just Rewards, and Reduced Costs
By creating an incentive for patent applicants to find and
disclose prior art to the USPTO, the quality of patents, in terms of
their validity, would increase.290 The quid pro quo at the heart of
the patent system would be justified more often; that is, more often
the USPTO would consider patent applications in light of the most
relevant prior art, and so more often it would issue patents only in
exchange for disclosure of truly new and nonobvious inventions.
Thus, the constitutional purpose of patents, to promote the progress
of science and useful arts,291 would be more often and more fully
realized. In addition, significant costs would be avoided by
preventing the unjust award of a patent in the first place. The
ability to collect monopoly profits based on truly invalid patents
would be reduced, and there would be fewer expenses associated
with license negotiations and less litigation involving truly invalid
patents.292
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit’s standard for proving invalidity, while
clear, is not supported by any convincing rationale. And while the
Federal Circuit has held that Supreme Court precedent and the
statutory presumption of validity require a clear and convincing
burden of proof in every circumstance, neither does. The Federal
Circuit’s invalidity standard—clear and convincing evidence in

290

One school of thought is that the best examination of patent claims is in patent
infringement litigation, not at the USPTO. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (concluding that “the [USPTO]
doesn’t do a very detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don’t want it to”
because of the cost and the fact that “the overwhelming majority of patents are never
litigated or even licensed”). But if the USPTO is going to examine patent applications at
all—and there is no indication that a registration system rather than an approval system is
on the horizon—then the USPTO should be considering the most relevant prior art.
291
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
292
The Supreme Court has held that the statutory presumption of validity does not
preclude application of estoppel in situations where a court previously held a patent
invalid. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349 (1971). In
so ruling, the Court noted its precedent encouraging the authoritative testing of patent
validity in light of severe economic consequences of assertions of invalid patents,
including the expense of patent infringement litigation. Id. at 344–48.
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every circumstance—should be replaced with a standard that
reflects whether the factfinder believes the USPTO considered the
most relevant prior art. If the factfinder believes it did, then the
clear and convincing burden of proof should apply. If the
factfinder believes it did not, then the preponderance burden of
proof should apply. The adoption of this new standard would
recognize the realities of USPTO examination, reflect the
precedent of the Supreme Court and all of the circuit courts other
than the Federal Circuit itself, increase patent quality, and reduce
transaction costs associated with licensing and litigating ultimately
invalid patents. In the end, patents would more often serve their
constitutional purpose of rewarding inventors for disclosing true
discoveries rather than recycled and obvious ideas.

